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ABSTRACT

Apart from the fact there is continuous support and nurturing ofBumiputera
entrepreneurship by the Malaysian government, very little is known about the politicallyaffiliated business group in Malaysia. This 100 percent Bumiputera group of companies
emerged as a result of the New Economic Policy. It started as a group of ailing
businesses in the early 1980s, but with strong support from the government and
ingenious Bumiputera leadership, it became one of the biggest, if not the biggest,
conglomerates in the country. This dissertation examines the profitability performance,
investment and financing decisions of the politically-affiliated business group, and
compares it to that of independent group. Since studies on corporate grouping are
mostly concentrated in the "bank oriented" system of the Japanese keiretsu [Nakatani
(1984); Kester (1991, 1992); Kaplan (1992); Hoshi, Kashyap and Sharfstein (1990,
1991); Prowse (1990, 1992)], the existence of the results from research on the Japanese
system allows us to provide an explanation of the behavior of the corporate grouping in
Malaysia, within the context of the politically-affiliated business group.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

The theory of corporate grouping mainly revolves around the corporate
grouping in Japan and in the United States. Some of the earliest literature on corporate
grouping was by Berle and Means1 (1932). Ever since researchers and academics
developed an interest in the Japanese keiretsu, the theory of corporate grouping
developed in the days of Berle and Means has become synonymous with the theory of
Japanese corporate grouping. Japanese keiretsu firms have received considerable
attention since the emergence of Japan as an economic super power of the world.
The keiretsu emerged as a result of government's intervention in the Japanese
economic systems. The accelerated growth of Japanese economy has been attached to
the formation of the Japanese keiretsu system. Yet the keiretsu system is not without
flaws. While some researchers have proposed that a system modeling the Japanese
keiretsu system be adopted to reform the economies of eastern Europe, others have
suggested against it. Weinstein and Yafeh (1995) claimed that keiretsu firms have lower

1

In 1932, Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means examined the separation of ownership and control in
American industry. The Modern Corporation and Private Property, a book that for some six1y years has
defined the intellectual mission of American corporate governance, reported that owners and major
corporations had become atomistic shareholders lacking the ability, skill, information, and often the
incentives to monitor the performance of specialized managers.

profitability and growth rates than non keiretsu firms, and a system modeled after the
Japanese keiretsu would further aggravate the reforming economies.
This study examines another alternative to the corporate grouping. The
politically-affiliated business group in Malaysia is in many ways similar to the Japanese
keiretsu. Based on previous study on the Japanese keiretsu, it is possible to draw direct
comparisons and contrasts to the politically-affiliated firms of Malaysia. There are both
similarities and differences between the Japan keiretsu and the politically-affiliated
business group in Malaysia which illustrate why the Malaysian case is worth studying.
First, like the Japanese keiretsu, there exist similar horizontal and vertical relationships
within the politically-affiliated business group. However, while these relationships center
around a financial core in the Japanese keiretsu, the relationship for the politicallyaffiliated business group center around the ruling political party2, that is, the United
Malays National Organization, better known as UMNO (pronounced as am-no). Second,
even though the role of private bank is insignificant in the politically-affiliated business
group, Yoshihara (1988) claimed that liquidity is not a constraint since firms in the
politically-affiliated group get easy access to soft-loans provided by government-owned
banks. Previous studies on the Japanese keiretsu have found that due to close main bank
relationships, liquidity is less of a constraint for this group than for independent firms
(Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein, 1991). Third, firms within the politically-affiliated
business group also bail out one another in times of financial distress, which is similar to

2

The ruling political party is the Barisan Nasional, or the National Front. and is represented by the
three main races in Malaysia. United Malays National Organization, or Utv1NO represents the Malays
and Bwniputera; the Malaysian Chinese Association, or MCA, represents the ethnic Chinese, and the
Malaysian Indian Congress, or MIC, represents the ethnic Indians.

2

the practice within the Japanese keiretsu. Hoshi et. al. provided evidence which suggests
that group firms in Japan invested more than independent firms in the period following
the onset of financial difficulty and subsequently enjoyed stronger future sales growth.
Thus a group affiliation enhances the performance of Japanese companies with a recent
history of financial trouble. Fourth, unlike the keiretsu group, the politically-affiliated
business group has superior growth opportunities since it is 100 percent burniputera3controlled thus it is well-positioned to take advantage of government's privatization
schemes. On the other hand, Nakatani (1984) observed that in Japan, the keiretsu group
on average has significantly lower profit and growth rates than the independent firms, but
the variability of both growth and profit rates of the group affiliated firms is much
smaller than that of independent firms.

Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this dissertation is to analyze whether the theory of capital
structure behavior of corporate grouping developed thus far for the Japanese keiretsu
groups can be applied to describe the profitability performance, investment behavior and
capital structure of the politically-affiliated firms in Malaysia. As a comparison, I analyze
and examine the determinants of these issues for independent firms in Malaysia.
This study attempts to analyze three issues in the context of the politicallyaffiliated business group in Malaysia. They are as follows:

3

literally, son of lhe earth, which represents the indigenous race, and is often used interchangeably with
Malays .

3

(I)

The profitability performance;

(2)

The investment decision; and

(3)

The financing decision.

Importance of the Study
The keiretsu affiliation in Japan has been under scrutiny of researchers from all
over the world. Despite the attention given to the keiretsu system, there remain
conflicting views regarding the main bank system. Some researchers have proposed that
a system modeling the Japanese keiretsu be adopted by the reforming economies in
eastern Europe. Others have suggested against it, mainly because keiretsu firms have
lower profitability and growth rate compared to non keiretsu firms.
The nature of the politically-affiliated business group in Malaysia is similar to
the Japanese keiretsu. While the Japanese keiretsu may be unique, a similar study on
another form of corporate groupings may allow us to determine whether similar
characteristics exists among business groupings in the region.
Unfortunately, while the keiretsu groups have received both positive and
negative reactions from researchers and academics world-wide, the political-affiliated
business group in Malaysia has somehow failed to receive any "unbiased" analysis. The
New Economics Policy has been attacked as being biased towards businessmen with
close links to United Malays National Organization. Critics alleged that wealth and
opportunity seem to be concentrated in the hands of a few politically connected people.

4

However, many probably have not realized that over the years, this group has managed
to create world class bumiputera companies. Even though the approach taken by this
group does not translate into a broad redistribution of wealth to bumiputera, it means
steering state assets to qualified bumiputera who are capable of turning them into profits.
In return, this group of companies provides job opportunities for the bumiputera and

attracts the best professionals, both bumiputera and non-bumiputera. The emphasis on
quality over quantity 4 for the sake of economic growth fits with Prime Minister Datuk
Seri Dr. Mahathir's National Development Program, which succeeded the NEP in 1991 .
Thus, the main purpose of this study is to provide an unbiased analysis of the
performance of the politically-affiliated firms. If the results of this study indicate that the
politically-affiliated business group firms have superior performance compared to
independent firms, then there are reasons to believe that the Malaysian government has
been successful in achieving economic parity for the Malays, who, just two decades ago,
were the least successful racial group in terms of entrepreneurship in Malaysia. This
study may also allow us to determine whether government intervention in the
distribution of wealth is effective in creating superior economic performance for business
entities. Additionally, it may determine whether politically-affiliated firms should be
encouraged as the model system in other developing and reforming economies.

4

The earlier part of the NEP stressed on quantity, i.e. extending business opportunities to any
bumiputera as long as he or she showed some interests in starting a business. This has resulted in
bumiputeras owning 100% of continually losing companies. Thus the government viewed that it is much
better to allocate business opportunities to bumiputera that can provide good results. which means
selecting only the quality bumiputera to lead profitable companies. (Far Eastern Economic Review,
12/21/95, p.30)

5

Dissertation Outline
Chapter two reviews the literature on political involvement in business in
Malaysia, theories and empirical works on corporate grouping developed for the
Japanese keiretsu and similarities and differences between the Japanese keiretsu and
Malaysian politically-affiliated business group.
Chapter three discusses the model and hypotheses. First, it develops the models
of profitability performance, financing behavior and investment behavior; Second, it
discusses the major determinants of three models; Finally, it reviews the basic
hypotheses ofthis study.
Chapter four develops the research methodology. The chapter discusses the
politically-affiliated group and independent group samples, the rational of the sample
period of the study, the data sources, definition of variables, measurement of the
variables and statistical models.
Chapter five presents the data analyses and empirical results. First it discusses
the summary statistics and conducts group comparison, next it discusses the regression
results for the politically-affiliated group and also for the two independent groups, and
finally it discusses the regression results for the entire sample.
Chapter six presents the summary and conclusions of the dissertation.

6

CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction
The theory of corporate grouping mainly revolves around corporate grouping in
both Japan and the United States. Some of the earliest literature on corporate grouping
was by Berle and Means (1932). Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means published "The

Modern Corporation and Private Property 5 ", a book that for some sixty years has
defined the intellectual mission of American corporate governance. It reported that
owners and major corporations had become atomistic shareholders lacking the ability,
skill, information, and often the incentives to monitor the performance of specialized
managers.

5

In 1932, Adolf Berle and Gardiner means published a classical work on the economic power of big
business. By examining the largest 200 nonfinancial American corporations, ranked by value of assets
(total assets less depreciation reserves) at the close of the "Roaring Twenties" (as of January l , 1930),
the authors confirmed that the top 200 big corporations, while only 0.07% of the total number of
businesses, controlled about half of total corporate assets. They speculated that the management unit
expands in scale as the corporate system is being adopted, thereby inevitably spreading share ownership.
The dispersion of share ownership would make it possible to acquire the control of productive assets by
holding a minimum of share ownership and eventually to establish " managerial control" with no
influential share ownership at all. Accordingly, "ownership of wealth without appreciable control and
control of wealth without appreciable ownership appear to be the logical outcome of corporate
development".

7

Ever since researchers and academics developed an interest in the Japanese
keiretsu, theory of corporate grouping developed in the days of Berle and Means has
become synonymous with the theory of the Japanese corporate grouping. Interest in the
Japanese keiretsu was generated by Japan' s impressive economic growth in the 1960s
and 1970s. Recovering from the war-ravaged economy of the late 1940s, Japan became
second in industrial exports to West Germany in 1978, surpassing the United States for
the first time in history (Sato, 1980). The dynamic force behind this tremendous
economic growth over more than three decades was Japan's modem industry run by
large Japanese businesses which were and continue to be supported by the government.
These groups of large enterprises, or known as the keiretsu, emerged as the result of
government intervention in the Japanese economic system. However, while the corporate
group in Japan is an indirect consequences of government's intervention into the
economy, the corporate grouping in Malaysia can be considered as a direct consequence
of politics intervention into business. The corporate grouping in Malaysia can be likened
to the corporate grouping in Japan in several ways. However, unlike in Japan where the
nexus of the corporate grouping centers on a main bank, the corporate grouping in
Malaysia revolves around the ruling political party. Even though a bank and a political
party are two distinct entities with very different functions and responsibilities, if the
political party is involved in business, then under this scenario, the objective of the
political party will be similar to the objective of a bank, that is to create wealth for the
owners and shareholders.

8

The first section of this chapter describes the history behind the politicallyaffiliated business group. It discusses the preferential treatment issue, the development of
the New Economic Policy, and subsequently the political involvement in business in
Malaysia. The second section reviews the literature on the corporate grouping in Japan
and discusses the similarities and differences in the corporate structures of Japanese
keiretsu firms and Malaysian politically-affiliated business group. The third and fourth
sections review the literature on profitability performance, investment decisions and
financing behavior. The last section summarizes the chapter.
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine whether the politically-affiliated
business group in Malaysia exhibits any behavior consistent with the behavior of
corporate grouping. The three behavioral issues to be examined are profitability
performance, investment decisions, and financing behavior. Additionally, this study will
also compare the politically-affiliated business group with the independent group, with
respect to the three issues. Thus the objective of this chapter is to discuss the
development of the theory of corporate grouping developed for the Japanese keiretsu
and relate this to the politically affiliated corporate grouping in Malaysia.

The New Economic Policy (NEP) and political involvement in business in Malaysia
Malaysia's population of 20 million6 people is made up of three main racial
groups of Malays or bumiputera7 , Chinese, and Indians. She gained her Independence on

6

1996 figure. Source: Malaysia Economic Reports.
literally, son of the earth. It also represents the diverse indigenous people of Sabah and Sarawak, but
more commonly refers to the Malays.

7

9

August 31, 1957, from the British and formal political authority was handed to the
Alliance Party. The Alliance, consisting of the United Malays National Organization
(UMNO), the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) and the Malayan Indian Congress
(MIC), represented the politically dominant Malay elements, Chinese business interests
and the Indian middle class respectively. As part of the political compromise underlying
the Alliance, the UMNO-led government was expected to continue to encourage the
development of the Malay business community. According to Stenson (1980), the
political compromise reached was meant to "guarantee Malay political and

administrative dominance, with special assistance to promote Malay education and
economic uplift, while guaranteeing citizenship rights and freedom from interference
for non-Malay commerce, culture and individuals'>&_
This, in effect, was to protect the Malay community by providing it special
rights, for its development. Thus, the Malays were granted special privileges in public
services, land reservation, and in the award of scholarships, educational grants, licenses,
and permits9 . At first, efforts by government departments and other agencies to assist the
Malays were concentrated on opening up estate settlements and constructing roads,
school, and other community facilities . The government used three main strategies in its
attempt to develop a Malay industrial capitalist class (Jomo, 1988, p248) :a)

Protection: Malay quotas were imposed on the award of business licenses, and in

the area of government employment, and education.

8
9

Stenson, 1980, p4 7.
Jomo, 1988, p253.
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b) Assistance: Facilities were provided in the form of credit, training, and business
premises.
c) Acquisition: Malay ownership of the corporate economy was to be expanded.

Jomo (1990) also described the special rights provided to the Malay community
as the government's " preferential treatment" to the Malays. He wrote that " in the first
decade or so after Independence, the expansion of the Malay middle class mainly
involved enhanced educational opportunities, recruitment quotas into the state
machinery, and other types of ' preferential treatment'. But as the Malay middle class
grew, it began to demand even more support for further expansion, especially into the
'commanding heights' of big business" (Jomo, 1990, p143). Pressure from this group led
the government to set up a trust agency, Majlis Amanah Rakyat (MARA) and establish a
Malay bank, Bank Bumiputera in the 1960s. MARA was responsible for setting up small
business projects in trade, industry and transportation. The hope was to encourage
greater Malay participation in these fields by selling these companies to the Malays when
these companies became viable. Bank Bumiputera, meanwhile, was established to
provide the financial thrust, assisting the Malays through easier access to credit facilities
and bank loans (Gomez, 1990).
The Malaysian economic development of the 1960s had not only maintained,
but probably increased income inequality, including the income gaps between the major
ethnic groups in Malaysia10 . When the Alliance lost ground to the opposition parties in

IO

.

Jomo (1990) stated that the mcome distribution in Malaysia worsened between 1957 and 1970, with
the rich become richer and the poor becoming poorer in all ethnic groups. The deteriorating socioeconomic and political situation of the 1960s came to be interpreted and seen primarily in ethnic terms .

11

the General Election in 1969, the opposition parties stirred anti-Malay riots which
erupted into two days of bloody violence, known as the May 13 riots. This incident
resulted in a major revision of government ideology, and the implementation of the New
Economic Policy (NEP), with two main objectives of fighting poverty and granting the
Malays a more equitable share of economic benefits. The NEP restructured the
Malaysian economy and eliminated the identification of race with economic activity. It
encouraged the urbanization of Malays and increased their participation in industry and
commerce. Within the context of continued open capitalist development, the
restructuring efforts are largely aimed at increasing the share ofbumiputera capital, as
well as the number ofbumiputera businessmen and professionals (Jomo, 1990).
The decade following the inception of the NEP marked a new era of political
involvement in business. Many bumiputera trust agencies 11 were established to acquire
corporate assets on behalf of the companies. The state' s increasing incorporation of
public enterprises was aimed at elevating the economic status of the bumiputera.
However, the upsurge in political business became significant only in the 1980' s. When
Datuk Seri Dr. Mahathir Mohamad assumed office as Malaysia's 4th Prime Minister in
July of 1981, the phenomenon of " politics in business" entered a more active phase.
While he was firmly committed to the ideals of the NEP, specifically of its use of public
enterprises and trust agencies to acquire assets on behalf of the bumiputera, he also
believed that this alone was not enough. His rationale was that the creation of a Malay
entrepreneurial community is vital to ensure that when assets acquired by the state are

11

such as Perbadanan Nasional Berhad, or National Corporation Limited (Pernas), and Permodalan
Nasional Berhad, or National Investment Limited (PNB).

12

eventually handed over to bumiputera, they would possess the skills to maintain and
develop their hold on these assets.
The 1980's corporate aggression of UMNO's investment arm, Fleet Holdings,
exemplified Mahathir's vision of how Bumiputera could actively participate in business.
After being put through a complicated series of share-swaps, takeovers, and mergers,
but not before coming dangerously close to bankruptcy during the mid- l 980s recession,
Fleet Holdings became the holding company of one of Malaysia's largest
conglomerates12 in 1991, public-listed Renong Bhd. Through an intriguing network of
cross-holdings that involved a number of private and public-listed companies, the onceailing Renong, led by a group of young, educated, and qualified Bumiputera executives,
had obtained effective control over the media, construction, and financial sectors by mid1991 (Gomez, 1991a).
Political party involvement in business is not unique to this part of the world. In
Indonesia, three political parties13 had established business enterprises in the 1950' s.
However, the rise of military rule and the subsequent suppression of these parties led to
the cessation of their involvement in business (Robison, 1986). Political involvement in
business in South Korea is less direct. A corporate group in South Korea known as
chaebol1 4 is also nurtured and guided by the government, and receives government

12

Other major conglomerates controlled by Bumiputera with close ties to the ruling elite have also
grm.vn rapidly. These conglomerates developed by Bumiputera businessmen were seldom initiated or
ex--panded through active involvement in manufacturing production, but rather by consolidation through
publicly listed vehicles.
13
, i.e. Partai Nasionalis Indonesia (PNI), Partai Sosialis Indonesia (PSI) and Majlis Syuro Muslimin
(Masyumi).
14
Appelbaum and Henderson (1992) described the chaebol arrangement as " a narrow development
alliance between the military regime and select large merchant capitalists that eventually shaped the
capital accumulation process during the period of export-oriented industrialization "(Appelbaum and
Henderson. 1992, pl25).

13

privileges. Nonetheless, it cannot be considered as a politically-affiliated business group
since it consists of independent manufacturing firms merged into a large conglomerate.
Yoshihara (1988) claimed that the politically-affiliated business group in Malaysia
often managed to get easy access to bank loans provided by government-controlled
banks and access to bank loans through their political influence. He further added that
those with strong government connections often manage to obtain big loans for
government projects. In truth, most of the projects undertaken by the political group are
government privatization projects and of national importance, such as the construction of
the North-South Highway, which allows a smooth flow of commerce and transportation
between the northern tip to the southern tip of Malaysia, and allows new satellite towns
to form along the highway. The projects are in line with the government New Economic
Policy plan, which has the primary aim of lifting the bumiputera out of poverty and into
parity with the country's other races, and has the secondary aim of achieving an
industrialized nation status by year 2020. Ho (1993) pointed out that since government
projects have to be given national importance, the central bank waived single borrower
lending limits to ensure that government projects would not be dependent on either
foreign partners or foreign funds. Thus in order to avoid relying on foreign funds and
eventually creating a negative impact on the balance-of-payment, bank loans from
government owned bank and other commercial banks have been made easily available to
the politically-affiliated business group.
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Theoretical and Empirical Review on the Corporate Grouping in Japan
In Japan the concentration of economic power has led to the existence of
influential groups of enterprises. The most well-known of these groups in the pre-1940
era were the zaibatsu. The zaibatsu, literally financial cliques, evolved into instruments
of excessive power that played a part in driving Japan into the Second World War. They
were the forerunners of today's industrial groupings in Japan 15 .
By the early 1960s, many of the companies previously associated with each of
the four major ex-zaibatsu had reestablished shareholding ties with one another, and
reintegrated as enterprise groups known by the name of"keiretsu16". The development
from zaibatsu to keiretsu highlights two points. First, in the pre-war zaibatsu the links in
the enterprise groups were centered on the commercial sector of their businesses.
Second, the pre-war zaibatsu took the form of"family konzerns" linked vertically and
topped by a holding company for the whole group. On the other hand, the post-war
keiretsu are centered around financial institutions, and take the form of konzerns in
which the enterprises are linked horizontally 17 • Banks were and still are the major nexus
of interlocking shareholding in these "financial keiretsu." Besides the progeny of the big
four, i.e., Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, and Fuyo (formerly Yasuda), the six major
keiretsu include the Dai-Ichi Kangyo group consisting mainly of former members of the
15

In 1948, the U.S. Occupation authorities dissolved the zaibatsu shareholding interlocks. Its main
purpose was to assure that a fonner enemy would never again become a threat to world peace, and it
achieved this purpose by disbanding the military and eliminating the industrial forces that had supported
it, i.e. the zaibatsu. At about the same time, the Japanese legislature passed the Supreme Commander for
Allied Powers (SCAP)-devised Antimonopoly Law {AML) which made holding companies illegal
(Miyashita and Russell, 1994).
16
keiretsu means "a closely tied complex of industrial and financial corporations".
17
see Miyashita et.al, (1994) p55 .
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smaller Kawasaki and Furukawa zaibatsu, and the Sanwa group which has no prewar
antecedent. Each of the six groups is respectively linked together through interlocking
shareholdings and through ties of trade and credit, and the largest members of each are
represented in the six respective monthly "presidents' council" meetings18 .
The two major classifications 19 ofkeiretsu are the horizontal keiretsu and the
vertical keiretsu. The horizontal keiretsu revolves around a financial core, which always
includes a major bank. There are six largest city banks (i.e., Dai-Ichi Kangyo, Sakura,
Sumitomo, Fuji, Sanwa, and Mitsubishi) and a leading long-term credit bank, the
Industrial Bank of Japan, which are commonly referred to as the center of their own
industrial group. In Japan, the keiretsu led by these six city banks have a special name,
the roku dai kigyo shudan, or Six Big Industrial Groups. In English, they are simply the
Big Six. At the center of a horizontal keiretsu there is always a nominal "flagship", which
is the city bank. However, there is often another behemoth - a trading company (shosha)
- which is roughly equivalent to the bank in influence, sailing right beside it. There may
even be a third firm, a giant manufacturer, also in this nucleus of the convoy. Around
these two or three giants circle the core members, usually three financial firms, and one

18

Today 's industrial groupings have long since surpassed the pre-war zaibatsu in economic importance.
Their political influence is strong, though not comparable to that of pre-war zaibatsu families . About
1,000 of the most successful Japanese companies are members of the 17 largest industrial groups. In
1985, these 17 groups accounted for 27 percent of the aggregate paid-up capital, 25 percent of the
annual turnover and 9 percent (2.9 million) of the employees of all Japanese companies (Eli, 1991).
19

There are various ways to classify a keiretsu, but the two most common classifications are the yoko (or
horizontal), and the tale (or the vertical). A horizontal keiretsu refers to a group of very large companies
with common ties to a powerful bank, united by shareholdings, trading relations, and so on. A vertical
or pyramid keiretsu is made up of one very large company and hundreds or thousands of small
companies subservient to it.
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or two very large manufacturers. Together the financial firms, the trading company, and
the group ' s key manufacturers give the keiretsu its identity.
In Malaysia, a similar kind of horizontal relationship exists within the political
group. However, unlike in Japan where the relationship revolves around a financial core,
the horizontal relationship in the politically-affiliated business group revolves around a
few holding companies20 which are directly owned by the United Malays National
Organization (UMNO), Malaysia' s dominant political party headed by Datuk Seri Dr.
Mahathir Mohamad, the prime minister. The politically-affiliated business group is 100
percent bumiputera-controlled thus it is well-placed to take advantage of government's
privatization schemes. They have stakes in several large companies with synergistic
potential, such as stakes in large construction firms, materials manufacturing firms,
cement manufacturers and several commercial banks. These large companies, together
make up the horizontal relationship which is similar to that of the horizontal keiretsu in
Japan.
To a large extent, the vertical relationship in keiretsu overlaps the horizontal
relationship. That is, many of the biggest vertical keiretsu lie inside the borders of the Big
Six. Almost all the Big Six companies are also the heads of their own vertical companies.
There is also a similar vertical relationship that exists within the politically-affiliated
business group in Malaysia. Each of the large key manufacturers and subsidiaries of the
holding companies are also heads of their own vertical companies. For example, beneath
United Engineers Malaysia (UEM), which is a large public-listed construction firm

20

One of the holding companies, Renong, is now controlled by investors closely allied to UMNO
leaders.
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owned by Renong, are other listed and non-listed firms. Four of the subsidiaries are listed
on the Main Board of the KLSE. [n the case of a construction company such as UEM,
most of the subsidiaries are firms manufacturing products for the parent company. All of
these companies produce some part or subassembly which ultimately works its way up
the pipeline to benefit the company at the top of the pyramid. This relationship is similar
to the vertical relationship in the keiretsu 21 .
Thus, the political group in Malaysia has horizontal and vertical relationships
similar in spirit to those of the Japanese keiretsu. The relationship revolves around a
holding company. It has government-owned banks that provide financing, and large key
manufacturers that complete the nucleus of the group. However, while the main bank
provides the main lending to the keiretsu firms, in the politically-affiliated group,
government-owned banks and commercial banks are the main lenders.
The Japanese keiretsu also has the distinct characteristic of firms bailing out
other firms in period of financial distress. Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1990) found
that group firms are helped in times of financial distress, not because it is efficient to help
them out, but simply because the group is unwilling to let one of its members fail2 2 .
There is a similar case of firms bailing out other firms in period of financial
distress within the political group in Malaysia. One of the companies in the group, Faber,
was saddled with accumulated debt in early 1990 but was bailed out by another company

21

(See Chart 1 for an example of horizontal and vertical relationships within the political business
group).
22
Hoshi et al. ,. suggested several reasons for this. Firstly, bankruptcy reflects badly on other group
finns; secondly, the managers of other group firms feel a personal loyalty to the managers of the
troubled company; thirdly, the bank executives are reluctant to admit that they made a mistake in
extending credit.
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in the group, Fleet Holdings23 . Firms in the group are known to help out other firms in
periods of financial distress. Even during a period of recession in the mid-1980 ' s, these
firms managed to sustain the financial turbulence unlike the independent firms.

Profitability Performance
In neoclassical economic theory, the objective of the firm is to maximize profits

or market value. Under this framework, the objective of corporate groupings must be to
maximize profits or market value of the member firms collectively. However,
econometric analyses of financial performance data on large Japanese manufacturing
firms have consistently reported negative effects related to group affiliation, and the
hypothesis of joint profit maximization cannot be applied to corporate groupings
(Nakatani, 1984). Nakatani 24 stressed that keiretsu groups in Japan has historically been
under little pressure to maximize profit25 . Their shares are largely held by one another,
and the group banks supplying the bulk of their financing have long-term growth.
Nakatani believes such strategies are driven by the Japanese firm ' s long- term
employment obligations to its workforce. He also found group firms exhibiting greater
profit stability and paying higher wages than independent firms. Nakatani found profit
rate for group affiliated firms, on average, is significantly lower than that of independent

23

see Gomez (1990), from page 83 to page 85.
Nakatani (1984) classified a manufacturing firm as affiliated with a keiretsu if, for three consecutive
years, more than 40 percent of the firm 's total debt was borrowed from financial institutions of the
keiretsu and 20 percent of the firm's stock was held within the keiretsu, or if historically, it was
~~iat~ with the keiretsu as, for instance, by long membership in the keiretsu presidents' council.
He COnJectured that the formation ofkeiretsu group increased the monopoly power of respective
members, but the monopoly power was utilized in the pursuit of a desired mode of distribution of output,
as well as in stabilization of corporate performance over time.
24
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finns and they have lower growth rates, but the variability of both the growth rate and
profit rate of the group affiliated firms is much smaller than that of the independent

Weinstein and Yafeh27 ( 1994) showed that corporate groups in Japan do not
earn higher profitability and growth, but the close bank-firm ties increase the availability
of capital when access to bond and equity markets is limited. They presented two main
reasons for the failure of corporate groups to perform better than other firms. First,
banks, as major debt-holders, are likely to be more risk averse than other equity holders.
Second, in return for the provision of capital and other services, banks are able to extract
rents from their client firms so as to offset any gains they may have over other firms.
Banks enjoy more market power when firms do not have easy access to other sources of
finance, and therefore can charge higher interest rates in exchange for liquidity services
and influence firms to avoid risky but profitable projects. They further demonstrated that
the liberalization of financial markets is important in reducing the market power of banks
by enhancing the contestability of financial markets.
One of the major purposes of setting up the politically-affiliated business group
in Malaysia is to create more bumiputera entrepreneurs. Initially, government
corporations were formed 28 to provide loans and business opportunities to burniputera
small businesses. However, according to Jomo ( 1993),

26

Nakataru·1
·
c aimed
that this is consistent with the hypothesis that the keiretsu member firms are not
profit maximizers, and is also consistent with the stability of performance hypothesis which indicates a
nsk-averse concept
2
; David E. Weinst~in and Yishay Yafeh (1995) examined the effects of a bank centered financial
3system on firm performance in Japan .
such as Rural Industrial Development Authority (RIDA) which was formed in the early 1960s, and
Federal Industrial Development Authority (FIDA) which was formed in 1965.
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"These 'infant' industries were not being forced or induced to grow up. There
was little pressure to transfer technology or skills. There was admittedly some growth. ..
but it was small. "29
However, the introduction of the NEP in the 1970 and subsequently, the switch
from infant industries to export-oriented industries30 gave a new impetus for industrial
growth. Under the leadership of the Prime Minister, the government adopted the 'Look
East Policy3 1 ' which emphasized heavy industrialization. The politically-affiliated
business group was set up to take advantage of the government industrialization program
and to encourage more bumiputera participation in business. Nevertheless, the World
economic crisis in the middle of the 1980s had a major impact on the Malaysian
economy32 , and particularly on the politically-affiliated business group. This was because
the politically-affiliated business group was involved in large investments with large
capital outlays, and due to the economic recession, affected the profitability performance

29

Jomo (1993, p24)
According to Jomo (1993), "the new emphasis on export-oriented industries was supported by the
NEP's commitment to modernizing Malaysia's open capitalist economy. Increasing local (including
state) ownership of productive assets, especially in primary production, and even reduced foreign
ownership of productive assets, especially in primary production, and even reduced foreign ownership
of industry were no longer considered incompatible with further integration and profitable participation
in the world economy .. . Various new measures - notably the establishment of Free Trade Zones from the
early 1970s - were introduced to facilitate and encourage Malaysian manufacturing production for
export .. " (Jomo, 1993, p25)
31
The 'Look-East' policy was established in the mid-1980s as a campaign to boost productivity, by
inducing hard work and promoting more effective models of labor discipline associated with the
Japanese. It was also seen as a fairly wide-ranging series of initiatives to become a 'newly
industrializing country' (NIC) by emulating the Japanese and South Korean 'economic miracles' The
real thrust of the campaign was the promotion of labor discipline through organizing industrial relations
to promote company loyalty (e.g. in-house unions), increase productivity (e.g. through better work
ethics), and reduce losses (e.g. quality control circles, 'zero defect' groups). Perhaps the similarities
between the Japanese keiretsu and the political business group are not by chance, but rather by design. ft
could be that the political business group was established with the 'Look-East' policy as the guideline,
that is, to form a business group that resembles the Japanese keiretsu group.
32 T
.
o examine the Malaysian economic impact on the political business group, the period of study of
this dissertation is divided into two periods. The first period is from 1985 to 1989, which is also the post
recession period, and the second period is from 1990 to 1994, which is the post NEP period.
30
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of the group. The first period of my study, that is from 1985 to 1989, is the post
recession period. It is also a period of 'turning around' for most businesses, since "by the

end of the 1980s, the industrial sector in Malaysia was once again expanding at a rapid
rate 33• "
Statistics on the corporate groups in Japan show a lower profitability and
growth rate compared to independent firms (Nakatani, 1984; Weinstein and Yafeh,
1995). However, due to the recession in the middle 1980s, the profitability performance
of the politically-affiliated business group may not be any different than that of the
independent group during the first five-year study period, that is from 1985 to 1989,
since most businesses were only starting to pick up the pieces left from the recession
period. Nonetheless, the second five-year period of the study may witness some
differences in profitability performance, since most of government privatization34 projects
took place during this period (See Appendix 2 for a summary of privatization projects
and forms of privatization).

33

see Jomo (1993 , p 34).
Privatization in Malaysia officially began in 1983, well after Mahathir had taken over as Prime
Minister in 1981. Unlike the 'Look East' policy and the ' Malaysia Incorporated' concept -also
associated with Mahathir 's administration -which appear to have faded in significance by the mid1980s, privatization has achieved a new vigor, especially with support, encouragement and advice from
powerful international agencies, and the economic downturn of 1985-86 (Jomo, 1990, p212).
34
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Investment Decisions and Financing Behavior3 5
Meyer and Kuh (1957) provided three theories of investment, i.e. the marginal
theories, the acceleration principle, and the institutional-empirical approaches 36 . Their
empirical results suggest the importance of internal liquidity in making investment
decisions. During 1928 and 1949 when economic conditions in the United States
stabilized or declined in several lines activity, the two liquidity measures, i.e. profits and
depreciation expense, provided the best explanation of investment future outlay. High
liquidity signals that the firm has done well and is likely to continue doing well. Thus,
more liquid firms have better investment opportunities, and they tend to invest more.
In a spirit similar to Meyer and Kuh, Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1990),
focused on liquidity to predict the investment behavior of the corporate group and
independent group in Japan. They adopted Nakatani's (1984) criterion for identifying
keiretsu members and nonmembers and for exploring differences in the investment
behavior between the two classes. They argued that keiretsu banks have strong
incentives to become informed about their firms and their investment opportunities, and
that they use the information to ensure that efficient choices are made. The reason is that
the banks, besides being lenders to the firms, are also important stockholders with
representation on the board of directors. They presented evidence consistent with the
35

There are three methods of financing an investment project. A finn can either raise funds by, i)
issuing debentures or shares, which is the direct financing method since it obtains funds directly from
the public; or ii) obtaining loans from some financial institutions, which is the indirect financing
method, since the financial institutions stand between the public, the providers of the funds, and the
firm, the source of demand for funds ; or iii) obtaining fund internally, that is, out of depreciation funds
and retained profits.
36
see M eyer and Kuh ( 1957), chapter II for a complete di seussion of the three modern theories of
investments.
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view that information and incentive problems37 in the capital market have important
effects on corporate investment. Their evidence came from the fact that investment by
firms, with a close relationship to a bank is much less sensitive to their liquidity than
firms raising their capital through more arms-length transactions.
Hoshi et al.,. interpreted their findings as evidence that group financing
arrangements relax liquidity constraints on group-affiliated firms. Yoshihara (1988) also
provided a similar interpretation for the politically-affiliated business group in Malaysia.
Firms in the politically-affiliated business group are less liquidity constrained than
independent firms because financing is provided by government-owned banks.
Furthermore, commercial banks are also under political pressure to provide loans to
firms in the politically-affiliated business group, while the central bank was reported to
have waived single borrower lending lirnits38 . This sort of financing arrangement not only
removes the dependency on either foreign funds or foreign partners, it also offers firms in
the politically-affiliated business group an important competitive advantage.

37

The capital market models suggest that due to information problems in the market, more liquid firms
should invest more. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argued that incentive problems raise the cost of
external finance . Outside financing dilutes management's ownership stake, thereby inducing incentive
problems since managers control the firm but do not own it. Myers and Majluf ( 1984) stressed that
information problems, rather than incentive problems, that will raise the cost of external finance . Both
reached a similar conclusion that since it is more attractive for fim1s to finance investment with internal
funds, for firn1s facing incentive and information problems, liquidity will be an important determinant
of investment.
38
.
see Jacqueline Ho, Malaysian Business, October 1, 1993, pl4.
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Summary
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the issues of profitability
performance, investment and capital structure behavior of the firms in the politicallyaffiliated business group in Malaysia, and to compare their performance with that of
firms in the independent group. Thus the objective of this chapter is to discuss the
development of theory of corporate grouping developed for the Japanese keiretsu and
relate this to the politically affiliated corporate grouping in Malaysia.
This chapter discusses the Malaysian political involvement in business, and
adopts the theory that relates it to the Japanese corporate grouping to explain the
behavior of politically-affiliated business group in Malaysia. The first section discusses
the New Economic Policy and political involvement in business in Malaysia. The second
section reviews the literature on the corporate grouping in Japan. The third section
discusses similarities and differences in corporate structure between the Japanese
keiretsu and the Malaysian politically-affiliated business group .
There are several similar characteristics possessed by the Japanese keiretsu and
the Malaysian political group. First, like the two relationship classifications of the
Japanese keiretsu, the relationships within the political group in Malaysia can also be
classified into horizontal and vertical relationships. The horizontal relationship revolves
around a holding company, it has government-owned banks that provide the financing,
and large key manufacturers that complete the nucleus of the group . However, while the
main bank provides the main lending to the keiretsu firms in Japan, the government-
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owned banks and other commercial banks in the politically-affiliated business group in
Malaysia are the main lenders. The vertical relationship in the politically-affiliated
business group exists in the form of large key manufacturers and other subsidiaries of the
holding companies owning firms that manufacture products for the parent company. All
of these companies produce some part or subassembly which ultimately works its way up
the pipeline to benefit the company at the top of the pyramid.
Perhaps the similarity should not surprise anyone if he or she understood the
prime minister's "Look-East" policy in the early 1980's (see footnote 34) . The "Look
East" policy of the prime minister was aimed towards industrializing the country
following the "Japanese way of doing business". A host of Dr. Mahathir "looking East"
policy initiatives include heavy industrialization, the preference for 'turn-key project'
arrangement, and the Malaysian car project. He further emphasized that the main thrust
in "looking East" involved the inculcation of Japanese-style work ethics, mainly referring
to efforts to increase productivity through harder work and greater loyalty to the
company. Thus "sogo-shosha" was the main theme for this group during the past decade.
The second similarity lies with the fact that both the keiretsu group and the
politically-affiliated business group are not liquidity constrained. Hoshi, Kashyap and
Scharsftein (1990) found that group financing arrangements in Japan relax liquidity
constraints for the group-affiliated firms. Yoshihara (1988) also provided similar
interpretation for the politically-affiliated business group in Malaysia. Firms in the
politically-affiliated business group are less liquidity constrained than independent firms
because financing is provided by government-owned banks.
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The third similarity is that, like their Japanese counterpart, firms in the
Malaysian politically-affiliated business group also bail out one another in periods of
financial distress.
Nevertheless, there are several issues which may differentiate the characteristics
of the Japanese keiretsu and the politically-affiliated business group. If the nucleus of the
group in the Japanese counterpart centers around a main bank, the nucleus of the
politically-affiliated business group centers around a holding company with very close to
the United Malays National Organization, UMNO, a ruling political party. Furthermore,
Nakatani (1984) found significantly lower profit and growth rates for group affiliated

firms, but on average, the variability of profit and growth rates are also much smaller,
Weinstein and Yafeh (1994) showed that the corporate groups in Japan do not earn
higher profitability or generate greater growth. These are some of the underlying issues
that this study hopes to examine for the politically-affiliated business group and to
compare with the independent group in Malaysia. In other words, like the Japanese
corporate group, does the politically-affiliated business group earn lower profits and
achieve lower growth rates than the independent group in Malaysia? Would its
investment decisions and financing behavior be different than that of the independent
group? The next chapter will discuss the hypotheses developed for this study.
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CHAPTER Ill
THE HYPOTHESES

Introduction
The review of previous studies demonstrates that there are several evidence on
the behavior of corporate groupings. For instance, while group affiliation is negatively
related to profits, the variability of profits is also much lower in group affiliated firms
than independent firms [Nakatani (1984), Demsetz and Lehn (1985)]. On the issue of
investment and financing decisions, Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991) argued that
liquidity is less constrained in group-affiliated firms compared to independent firms,
based on Meyer and Kuh's (1957) contention that liquidity is an important determinant
of investment.
The objective of this study is to test the preferential treatment hypothesis based
on the theory of corporate grouping. There are three issues to be examined here, i.e. , the
profitability performance, the investment decision, and the financing behavior. These
three issues will be examined to compare the difference between politically-affiliated
business group and independent group . The first section of this chapter will formulate the
three main hypotheses for the study. The second section will discuss the dependent and
independent variables. The last section summarizes the chapter.
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Profitability Performance, Investment Decision and Financing Decision
Over the past several years, Malaysia' economy has grown at an annual rate
exceeding eight percent. Behind the strong performance of private industry is increased
government spending. According to the Economic Report of 1994/1995 issued by the
Ministry of Finance, public investment in 1994 increased by 29 percent from RM21 ,426
million in 1993 to RM27,635 million with the implementation of Sixth Malaysia Plan
(6MP) projects which gathers momentum towards the end of its plan period (Economic
Report, 1995). The bulk of the government mega projects are most often be awarded to
the politically-affiliated business group firms, since this group not only is 100%
bumiputera-controlled, it is also closely affiliated with the ruling party. Thus this group
often gets preferential treatment whenever it comes to government-awarded contracts39 .
The literature review reports inconclusive results on the relation between
profitability performance and corporate groupings. N akatani ( 1984) reported that profit
rate is lower for affiliated firms than independent firms and he found support in
Weinstein and Yafeh (1995) and Prowse (1990). Nakatani (1984) found that not only are
profit and growth rates lower for group affiliated firms in Japan, but their variability in
profit and growth rates are also much lower. Thus he concluded that affiliated firms seek
to stabilize profits and growth over time. This is consistent with Weinstein and Yafeh
(1995) who suggested that the reason the profit rate is lower for the affiliated firms is
because banks, as the major lender, are risk averse, thus banks prefer less risky projects
with lower returns than risky projects with higher returns. However, even though
39

see Yoshihara (1988), page 125 .
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Prowse (1992) found a lower profit rate for group-affiliated firms compared to
independent firms in Japan, he found no difference in the volatility of asset returns
between these two groups.
On the contrary, the Malaysian politically-affiliated business group may not
have lower profit and growth rates than independent group. Since 1970, the government
has pursued a policy aimed at stimulating economic growth in order to lift the Malays
out of poverty and into parity with the country's other races. Thus, the preferential
treatment given by the government may stimulate growth and develop Bumiputera
entrepreneurship. Consequently, the assertion is that profit and growth rates for the
politically-affiliated group will be higher than independent group.
Kester (1986) suggested that information effects favor relatively higher leverage
in Japan. His argument is based on a previous finding by Myer and Majluf ( 1984). Myer
and Majluf showed that if there is an asymmetry of information, then companies with
favorable prospects tend to have higher leverage ratios. These companies rely more on
internal financing and the issuance of safe securities to avoid the underpricing of an
otherwise valuable project. Alternatively, Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991) showed
that liquidity, i.e., the availability of internal funds, should be an important determinant of
investment when there are information problems in the capital market. They found that
firms with close ties to a Japanese main bank (i.e., a bank that serves as their primary
source of external financing and thus is likely to be well informed about the firm), are
less liquidity constrained than firms with weaker links to a main bank.
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The politically-affiliated business group is often involved in projects of national
importance and they tend to get easy access to bank loans from commercial banks and
government-owned banks, since, according to Yoshihara (1988), banks in Malaysia are
under heavy political pressure to extend loans to the political group.
Yoshihara ( 1988) claimed that the politically-affiliated business group in
Malaysia managed to get easy access to loans provided by government-controlled banks
and private loans through their political influence. Therefore, intuitively, firms in the
politically-affiliated business group in Malaysia are less liquidity constrained than
independent firms. Based on Yoshihara' s assertion, it is my conjecture that the
politically-affiliated business group is less liquidity constrained simply because of political
patronage or preferential treatment rather than of information asymmetry. Additionally,
through political influence, the politically-affiliated business group not only manages to
get easy access to loans provided by government-controlled banks (i.e., which may
determine its financing decision), it is often the largest beneficiary of government
projects (i.e., which may subsequently determine its investment decision).

Hypothesis
The hypotheses of this study are as follows:
HYPOTHESIS I : Given that the firms in the politically-affiliated business group in
Malaysia obtain preferential treatment from the government, they are more likely to
venture into profitable projects, thus this study may observe higher profitability
performance for the politically-affiliated group. On the other hand, these projects are also
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of national importance and meant for public

consumptio~

thus, return from government

projects may be small but stable. The preferential treatment hypothesis predicts that the
politically-affiliated business group in Malaysia not only has superior profitability
performance measures compared to independent group, it also predicts that the
determinants of profitability performance for the group are different than independent
group.
HYPOTHESIS II : Given that the country is gearing itself towards achieving a
developed country status, government spending is increasing at a rapid rate. Thus, the
preferential treatment hypothesis predicts that the politically-affiliated business group in
Malaysia has higher investment measure compared to that of the independent group.
Consistently, since the politically-affiliated business group is often involved in
government privatization plans and the building of the infrastructure for the natio~ its
investment decisions are basically being determined by politicians. Thus the preferential
treatment hypothesis predicts that the politically-affiliated business group in Malaysia
exhibits different investment behavior pattern compared to independent group.
HYPOTHESIS III : Given that firms in the politically-affiliated business group are
closely affiliated to the ruling party, they get easy access to bank loans and loans from
government owned banks. In order to avoid reliance on foreign funds, commercial
banks in Malaysia are under political pressure to extend loans to firms in the politicallyaffiliated business group. The preferential treatment hypothesis predicts that firms in the
politically-affiliated business group in Malaysia are less liquidity constrained, and since
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they prefer to raise loans to finance their investments, have a different financing behavior
pattern than firms in the independent group.

The Explanatory Variables

Liquidity (LIQ)
Previous study found group-affiliated firms in Japan to be less liquidity
constrained than independent firms [Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein ( 1991)]. Hoshi, et
al., provided some evidence which suggests that liquidity is an important determinant of
investment, and more so for independent firms than for group-affiliated firms. Thus,
when liquidity is high, a firm will utilize internal funds to invest in profitable projects
rather than raising capital through loans. Additionally, there will be lesser need for
outside financing. This indicates a negative relation between liquidity and financing.
Meyer and Kuh (1957), who pioneered the study of liquidity effects on
investment, used the stock of net quick liquidity, i.e., current assets less inventory and
current liabilities, as a liquidity measure. They found that liquidity is an important
determinant for investment. Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1990) used two measures
of liquidity. The first was a cash flow measure, which is income after tax plus
(accounting) depreciation less dividend payments. The second was the stock of liquid
assets measure, which is the level of short-term securities at the beginning of the period.
Since firms in the politically-affiliated business group are often involved in
projects of national importance, they get preferential treatment in obtaining bank loans
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from government-controlled banks and commercial banks. Thus I expect firms in the
politically-affiliated business group to be less liquidity constrained than independent
firms.
On the issue of the relationship between liquidity and investment decisions, I
expect liquidity to be positively related to investment decisions for independent firms but
not for firms in politically-affiliated business group, since independent firms will have to
rely more on the availability of liquidity in order to make future investment plans, while
firms in the politically-affiliated business group do not.
Liquidity should also be negatively related to financing since based on pecking
order theory, firms with high liquidity will tend to choose internal funds for investment
purposes, rather than raising outside financing. Additionally, based on the same theory, I
expect a positive relation between liquidity measures and profitability measures.

Risk measures
I use three measurements of risk. Two measures to proxy for operating risk,
and one to proxy for the systematic risk of an investment. The traditional theory of
relating risk and rate of return assumes that most stockholders are risk averters, and
therefore require a higher return, i.e., risk premium, for taking on more risk. Under this
"risk premium hypothesis", earning volatility should be positively related to return.
Earnings volatility is expected to be negatively related to leverage ratio since
high-earnings volatility implies a higher probability of financial distress occurring.
However, previous studies found a positive relation between leverage and operating risk
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[Myers (1977); Kim and Sorensen (1986); and Chang and Rhee (1990)], while Bradley,
Jarrell and Kim (1984) and Jensen, Solberg and Zorn (1992) found a negative relation
between risk and leverage.
On the issue of whether the politically-affiliated business group has higher risk
measures compared to independent firms, prior discussion leads me to believe that firms
in the political group are seldom involved in high risk projects. Thus, it is uncommon to
find firms in the politically-affiliated business group who suffer from liquidation
problems. However, due to the close group affiliation, even if the probability of
bankruptcy exists among these firms, other firms will step in to bail out firms in financial
distress.
According to Nakatani (1984), firms in the keiretsu group have lower profits
and growth compared to the independent group, but their variability of profits and
growth are much lower. This is due to fact that keiretsu firms moved towards achieving
long-term stability. We can observe a similar scenario in Malaysia, whereby the
horizontal and vertical relations that exist between firms in the political group should
ensure long-term business stability. Nevertheless, I believe not only does political
patronage ensure the long term financial stability of this group, but also that the
corporate expertise of these group firms has lead to the rise in business fortunes for this
politically-affiliated business group. Thus I expect operating risk to be lower for
politically-affiliated group than for independent group.
The expected return on a risky asset should be dependent only on that asset 's
systematic risk. Since beta indicates how the individual stock return moves with the
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market, if beta is less than l , then it will indicate that the stock is generally less risky than
the market and if it is more than 1, then this will indicate that the stock is generally
riskier than other stocks in the market. The price of a stock reflects an investor's overall
expectation of the value of the stock. In other words, the risk measurement indicates
how investors view the stock return performance of a firm . Do investors regard the
politically-affiliated business group as a riskier investment than the market?
Under the "risk premium hypothesis", this study expects the risk measures to be
positively related to return. Based on previous assertion that high operating risk firms
tend to use higher debt, this study expects a positive relation between risk and leverage.

Firm Size
In economics literature, market-structure factors play an important role in

determining firm's profits. As suggested by Bain (1956), firm size can be regarded as a
sort of "capital requirement" banier of entry. Additionally, Baumol (1959) argued that
large firms have greater access to capital and have higher profits. As the capital-cost
aspects of an entry barrier, firm size is expected to be positively related to profitability.
On the other hand, size and profitability may be negatively related owing to x-efficiency
or diseconomies of scale. X-efficiencies is referred to as the inefficiency caused by poor
management with internal slack or waste. This argument is equivalent to Jensen and
Meckling' s ( 1976) agency-cost argument. According to Jensen and Meckling, the larger
the firm size, the higher the agency cost, thus, low profitability is expected. Therefore the
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net impact of firm size on profitability depends on the trade-off between the positive
effect of an entry barrier and the negative effect caused by agency problems.
The firm size effect has received wide attention in both the popular and
academic financial literature. Reinganum ( 1981) and Banz ( 1981) found that small firms,
on average, yield higher returns compared to large firms. Using time-series data, Fama
and French (1992b) found firm size to have strong explanatory power of average crosssectional stock returns. Consistently, Fazilah (1996) also observed a small firm size effect
in Malaysia. She found that small firms on average obtain higher risk-adjusted rates of
return than large firms. Market-adjusted returns are also used as an alternative measure
of performance.
Additionally, Chang and Rhee (1990) found that large, well-established firms
have easy access to the capital markets, while small, new firms do not. Titman and
Wessels (1988) provided another explanation for the firm size effect. According to them,
small firms may be more leveraged than large firms since it is more expensive for small
firms to issue new equity. Thus, small firms may prefer to obtain short term loans rather
than issue long term debt because of lower fixed costs associated with this alternative.
Their results showed that there is a positive relationship between size and debt-to-book
value of equity. They used the natural logarithm of sales as an indicator of size.
Based on previous studies, I expect a positive relation between financing
measure and firm size, and a negative relation between firm size and profitability
performance.
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Growth
Finance and economic researchers have historically agreed that there is a
positive relationship between firm growth and debt, ceteris paribus. Hurdle ( 1974)
contends that if growth is expected to be temporary, stockholders might wish to finance
through debt to avoid dilution of their control. This argument is consistent with the
pecking order theory. Rapid growth may imply higher debt capacity and on ability to pay
interests; lenders may charge a lower cost to the firm with sound future prospects.
However, from the agency theory framework, Titman and Wessels (1988)
argued that firms in growing industries suffer higher agency cost of debt due to higher
opportunities of asset substitution. In addition, growth opportunities are valuable assets
but they cannot be collateralized, thus Titman and Wessels, consistent with Jensen and
Meckling (1976), Myer (1977) and Stulz (1990), suggested a negative relation between
debt and growth. Consistently, Lang, Ofek and Stulz (1995) also found a strong negative
relation between leverage and growth. They argued that firms with greater leverage than
the industry median grow at a rate less than the industry median.
Additionally, Tobin and Brainard ( 1977) employed a valuation equation which
relates the current market value (which reflects the expected future cash inflows
discounted at the appropriate discount rate) to the replacement costs of assets as a
yardstick against which the market value of firms may be analyzed. By expressing the
total market value of the firm in relation to the replacement value of the underlying
assets, called the Tobin' s q ratio, the excess market value of the firm is measured.
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Tobin's intent was to examine the causal relationship between growth and investment.
He argued that if, at the margin, q exceeds unity, firms would have an incentive to invest,
since the value of their new capital investment would exceed it's cost. Thus there should
be a positive relation between growth and investments.
I would expect politically-affiliated firms to have higher growth measures than
independent firms since they have easier access to government-awarded projects, and
since more growth opportunities are made available to them. On the issue of the relation
between growth measure and the endogenous variables, based on previous literature, I
expect a positive relation between the growth measures and investment decisions, and
between growth measure and financing decisions.

Industry classification (IC)
Titman ( 1984) showed that firms that make products requiring the availability
of specialized servicing and spare parts will find liquidation especially costly. This
indicates that firms that manufacture machines and equipment should be financed with
less debt. Previous researchers have found industry classifications a significant predictor
of financial structure. This implies that the optimal capital structure may vary by industry
structure. Industry classification can be used as a proxy for business risk. However,
industry classifications may also act as proxy for other factors affecting capital structure.
Marsh's ( 1982) results indicated that industry classifications are correlated to asset
composition, risks, growth and profits. This study classifies firms into three industry
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classifications, based on the sector groupings from the New Straits Times and KLSE
Industrial groupings.

Summary
The objective of this study is to test the preferential treatment hypothesis. The
three major measures to be examined are the profitability performance measures, the
financing measures and the investment measures. This study presents three hypotheses
which relate to the preferential treatment hypothesis. The first hypothesis is that the
politically-affiliated business group in Malaysia has better profitability performance
measure being in an affiliated group rather than not. The second hypothesis is that the
politically-affiliated business group exhibits different investment behavior pattern
compared to independent group. The third hypothesis is that firms in the politicallyaffiliated business group have a different financing behavior pattern than firms in the
independent group .
The dependent measures in this study are the profitability performance
measures, the financing decision measures and the investment decision measures, while
the independent measures are represented by liquidity, risk, size and growth measures.
The discussion on the dependent and independent variables lead us to several
hypotheses. Based on previous studies, this study hypothesizes a positive relationship
between liquidity measure and the three dependent measures; a positive relationship
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between risk measures and profitability performance measures, and negative relationship
between risk and leverage measure; a positive relationship between size and financing
measure, and a negative relationship between size and profitability measure; and finally, a
negative relationship between growth and investment and also financing decisions.
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CHAPTER VI
DATA AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The Data
The sample consists of firms classified as either politically-affiliated or
independent. Politically-affiliated firms are defined as firms with close affiliation with the
ruling political party, i.e., the United Malays National Organization (UMNO).
Independent firms are defined as firms which are not affiliated with the ruling party.

Selection of Politically-Affiliated Business Group

Firms in the politically-affiliated business group are identified from the Kuala
Lumpur Stock Exchange Handbooks, holding company annual report40, news articles in
The New Straits Times, The Star Newspapers, The Far Eastern Economics Review, The
Wall Street Journal, Gomez (1995) and Cheong (1996). From these sources, I managed
to trace six holding companies which are closely affiliated to the ruling party.

Next, from company annual reports and from the Kuala Lumpur Stock
Exchange handbooks from 1988 to 1995, I identified forty one subsidiary companies of

~

Renong Annual Report, 199).
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these six holding companies. This gave me a total of forty seven public-listed companies,
five in the financial industries and forty two in the non-financial industries. However,
since I only selected non-financial firms with complete data from January 1985 to
December 1994, the final sample of politically affiliated firms was 35. Firms are divided
into three industrial groups. These industrial groups are based on the sector groupings of
the New Straits Times and the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange Industrial grouping. The
first group contains firms from the consumer products, trading services and hotels
sectors. The second group contains firms from the industrial products, construction and
properties sectors, while the third group contains firms from the plantation and mining
sectors. The final sample of 35 firms consists of23 firms in the first group, 5 firms in the
second group and 7 firms in the third group.

Selection of Independent Firms

The independent firms are selected from the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange
Handbooks. I traced the ten largest shareholders of the companies, and confirmed that
none of the independent firms are affiliated to the ruling party nor to the firms in the
politically-affiliated business group in the form of ownership.

I included two types of independent firms selections. The first selection contains
a matching set of independent firms . These firms are matched with firms in the
politically-affiliated group according to industrial grouping and size. Since the politicallyaffiliated group contains 23 firms in the first industrial group, 5 firms in the second
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industrial group, and 7 firms in the third industrial group, the matching independent
group also contains equal number of firms in each industrial group, all of equal or almost
equal size to the politically-affiliated firms in the same industrial groupings.

The second selection of independent firms contain a set of fully independent
firms also coming from the same industrial grouping. Since the politically-affiliated
business group is more concentrated in terms of ownership structure, the second
selection is based on 35 firms from the same industrial group with more diluted
ownership. The selection of 35 independent firms with diluted ownership is determined
from the ten largest shareholders from the last three editions of the KLSE handbook, i.e.,
1992, 1993 and 1994. This analysis may provide some contrasting evidence with respect
to the effect of concentrated ownership on profitability performance, financing decisions
and investment measures. By selecting fully independent firms, we may be able to
disentangle the effect of ownership concentration on the three issues under study.

Berle and Means41 (1932) defined control as the power to select the board of
directors. They measured ownership as 20 percent or more of voting stocks owned by an
individual or a group of stockholders. Herman (1982) suggested ownership of 5 percent
of a firm's common stocks as a benchmark, beyond which ownership is no longer
negligible. Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) also found 'conditions necessary for
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The basic argument of Berle and Means is that the modern day corporation have grown so large that a
few of these control a major proportion of the financial assets of the corporate economy. This increase in
size has led to a dispersion of share ownership. This phenomenon has resulted in a situation in which
the 'owner of industrial wealth is left a mere symbol of ownership. while the power, the responsibility
and the substance which have been an integral part of ownership in the past are being transferred to a
separate group in whose hands lies control' (1932:68). They measured ownership control by the
ownership of at least 20 percent voting stocks by an individual or a group of stockholders. Control is
measured simply by the percentage of stocks owned by an individual or group of stockholders.
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entrenchment .. not much different for firms with greater than 25 percent board
ownership ' (p. 295). Among the I 00 largest corporations in the Kuala Lumpur Stock
Exchange, Lim ( 1981) found that stock ownership is 'highly concentrated in the hands of
a few institutions and ultimately, a few wealthy families' (p. 114). Based on Berle and
Means definition of ownership control, the second selection of independent firms
contains firms with less than 20 percent of voting stocks held by an individual or a group
of stockholders.

The rational of employing the two independent firm selections is to provide a
broader analysis of the study. In other words, I may be able to compare the politicallyaffiliated business group with not only independent firms of the same sizes and industry
groupings, but also with independent firms of more diluted ownership.

Selection of Industrial Grouping
The selection of industrial grouping is based on the sector groupings from the
New Straits Times and KLSE Industrial groupings. The business section of the New
Straits Times classified firms into 11 industries42 . Since the politically-affiliated firms can
only be found in eight of these eleven industries, this study divides these eight industries
into three industrial groups. Group 1 consists of three industries, i.e., consumer
products, trading services and hotels; Group 2 consists of three industries, i.e., industrial
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i.e., consumer products, industrial products, construction, trading services, infrastructure, finance,
hotels, properties, plantation, mining and trust (The New Straits Times, October 9, 1996, p3 l).
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products, construction and properties; Group 3 consists of two industries, i.e., plantation
and mining.

Period of Study

For the study, the data was separated into two five-year sub-periods. The first
sub-period is from 1985 to 1989. The second sub-period is from 1990 to 1994. This
separation was chosen because the New Economic Policy (NEP) ten-year plan ended in
1990 and the post-NEP era, when government ruling on Bumiputera equity ownership
was no longer strictly emphasized, began in 1990.

Additionally, 1990 marks the beginning of the period of government
privatization plans, thus the two five-year periods before and after post-NEP will provide
a comparative analysis of the performance of the politically-affiliated business group. It
may offer some insights into whether the government privatization plans had any positive
impact on the performance of the politically-affiliated business group. Finally, the first
sub-period from 1985 to 1989 marked the start of the recession and recovery period43 in
Malaysia. This may offer some insights into whether the politically-affiliated business
group had similar financial crises like firms of the independent group. The choice of
1994 as the end of the second sub-period is due to data limitations.

43

The recession period was from 1984 to 1986, and the period of recovery was from 1987 to 1988.
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Data Source

The following files are retrieved from the PACAP Databases-Malaysia compiled
by the Sandra-Ann Morsilli Pacific-Basin Capital Markets Research Center (PACAP) at
the University of Rhode Island:

1) Financial Statements file for Industrial Companies to get annual accounting data.

2) Monthly Stock Price and Returns file to get monthly stock return data.

3) Monthly Market Index file to get monthly market return data.

4) Key Economic Statistics file to get the 12-month Treasury Bill rates.

Data are also checked against the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange Annual
Handbook and the annual reports of various companies.

Dependent Variables
Profitability Measures
I use three alternative measures of profitability performance: return on equity
(ROE), return on assets (ROA), and market-adjusted returns. The first two measures,
ROE and ROA are a replication of the measurement used in Nakatani ( 1984 ), while the
market-adjusted return measure is consistent with Kang's and Shivdasani's (1995)
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measure of performance. ROA and ROE are two measures of accounting profit while
market-adjusted return is a measure of economic profit. The main difference between the
accounting profit and economic profit is that the former does not focus on cash flows
when they occur, whereas the latter does. The economic definition of profit correctly
deducts the entire expenditure for investment in plant and equipment at the time the cash
outflow occurs.
The profitability measures are as follows:
1) Return on assets = net income after taxes/ total assets
2) Return on equity = net income after taxes/ shareholder' s equity
3) Market adjusted returns (R*j )

=

Rj - Rut

where,
R *j
Rj

=

=

market-adjusted annual return for stock j;

annual stock return for stock j;

Rut = market return.

Investment Decision Measures
The first investment decision measure is a replication of Hoshi, Kashyap and
Scharfstein ( 1991 ). It is given by:

INVI = I/ K

where

I = changes in net fixed assets between period t and period t-1
K = total fixed assets in period t-1
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Since the objective of this study is to examine the investment decisions of the
political firms, that is, how these firms decide on what future investments they should
undertake, the above ratio will indicate that the higher the ratio, the higher be the level of
investment by the firm. However, this reasoning may not be applicable to the political
firms, since most of their future investment projects will be directly or indirectly related
to government expenditure plan.
The second investment measure is given by:
INV2 =

net fixed asset I book value of total asset
It measures the capital intensity of the firm . The higher the ratio, the higher will

be the use of capital.
The difference between the two measures is that the first is a flow measure and
the second is a stock measure.

Financing Decision Measure
The financing decision measures are given as follows:
FINI =(total liabilities - current liabilities)/ (total liabilities - current liabilities +
book value of equity)
FIN2 =interest-bearing loans I (interest-bearing loans+ market value of equity)
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The first measure examines the effect of long term liabilities and book value of
equity on the financing decision, while the second measure examines the debt to equity
ratio as the financing decision.

Explanatory Variables
Liquidity (LIQ)
Following Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1988), this study uses income after
tax plus (accounting) depreciation less dividend payments as a liquidity measure.
Risk Measures
This study examines two types of risk, the operating risk and the systematic
risk. The operating risk has two measures, one is the coefficient of variation of annual
percentage change in net operating income, an indicator of earning variability44 (CVl),
and the other is coefficient of variation of annual percentage change in sales, an indicator
of sales variability (CV2). Coefficient of variation is standard deviation of mean divided
by mean. It measures the percentage of standard deviation relative to the mean annual
changes. This is an alternative indicator for volatility. The two measures, CVl and CV2
represent the operating risk of the firm, which is also known as unsystematic risk.
The third measure of risk is beta which represents the systematic risk. The
formula for beta is given by the covariance between returns on a the risky asset and
market portfolio, divided by the variance of the market portfolio. It is a comprehensive

44

This is consistent with Tilman and Wessels ( 1988).
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measure which captures the systematic risk of the firm's common stock relative to the
market portfolio. It consists of business, operating and financial ri sk of the firms.
Firm Size
The natural logarithm of market equity is the indicator of size.
Growth
There are two growth indicators, the annualized compound growth rate in total
assets, which is consistent with Titman and Wessels (1988), and Chang and Rhee (1990),
and Tobin's q. This study uses proxy for q following Kang and Stulz (1995) which is
defined as the ratio of total liabilities plus market value of equity to total liabilities plus
book value of equity.
Industry Classification (IC)
This study classifies firms into three industry classifications, based on the sector
groupings from the New Straits Times and KLSE Industrial groupings. Group 1 consists
of three industries, i.e., consumer products, trading services and hotels; Group 2 consists
of three industries, i.e., industrial products, construction and properties; Group 3
consists of two industries, i.e., plantation and mining. Dl is equal to l if group equals to
l; and zero otherwise. D2 is equal to l if group equals to 3 and zero otherwise. The
control variable is group 2.
Group Dummy
G is equal to 1 for politically-affiliated group and zero otherwise.
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Research Methodology
To test the preferential treatment hypothesis, I use cross-sectional ordinary least
squares regression approach and regress the profitability performance measures, the
investment decisions measures and financing behavior measures against five explanatory
variables, i.e., liquidity, risk, size, growth and industry dummy.
The whole period regression analyses use ten-year average of data of each firm .
The sub-period regression analyses use five-year average of data of each firm . The
regression analyses are first conducted for the whole period and the two sub-periods for
the politically-affiliated business group and the two selections of independent group.
Only dummy variables for industry classifications will be included. D 1 represents
industrial group 1, while D2 represents industrial group 3.
Next, the regression analyses will be conducted for the whole period and for the
two sub-periods for the entire samples. A dummy variable, G, will be included where G
is equal to 1 to represent the politically-affiliated business group and 0 otherwise.
Non-parametric analyses are conducted to compare the average often-year
statistics and five-year statistics (for two sub-periods) between politically-affiliated group
and the two independent groups. Additionally, the average of five-year average statistics
for the politically-affiliated business groups are compared between the two sub-periods.
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The Models
The Endogenous Variables
i)

Profitability Measures : ROA, ROE, R *j

ii)

Investment Decision Measures: INVI, INV2

where
INVI = changes in net fixed investments I total fixed investments
INV2 = net fixed asset I book value of total asset;

iii)

Financing Decision Measures: FINI and FIN2
FINI = (total liabilities - current liabilities) I (total liabilities - current liabilities
+book value of equity)
FIN2 =(interest-bearing loans) I (interest-bearing loans+ market value of
equity)

The Exogenous Variables
The exogenous or independent variables are LIQ, CVJ , CV2,
GRW,
where

p, SIZE,

Q, IC,G
LIQ

= income after tax plus accounting depreciation less
dividend payments;
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CVl

The coefficient of variation of annual changes in net
operating income;
The coefficient of variation of annual changes in net

CV2

sales;

P

= beta;

SIZE

= log (market equity);

GRW

= annual compound growth rate in total assets;

Q

=(total liabilities+ market value of equity)/( total

liabilities + book value of equity);

IC = D 1 = 1 if industry is 1; and zero otherwise;
D2 = 1 if industry is 3; and zero otherwise.
DUMMY G

= I for politically-affiliated business group and 0
otherwise ..

The Ordinary Least-Squares Models
The ordinary least-squares and the expected signs of coefficients of the models
which include all independent variables are as follows :

ii) lNVl, INV2 = Yo+ y1LIQ - Y2GRW

± y3RISK ± Y4 Dl ± Ys 02 ± Y6G
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iii) FINI , FIN2

Ao+ A. 1LIQ - A.2RISK + A3SIZE - A4GRW ± As DI + A.6 D2 ±
A.1G

Summary
This chapter developed the research and methodology used in this study. It
discussed the source and composition of data. It explained the selection of politicallyaffiliated business group, the independent group matched according to industrial
grouping and size, and the independent group with less than 20 percent of voting stocks
owned by an individual or group of stockholders. It also explained the selection of
industrial grouping and the period of study. Additionally, this chapter defined and
explained the variable measurements, and presented the regression models used in the
study.
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CHAPTERV

RESULTS

Sample Description
Table 1 presents the summary statistics on market capitalization from 1985
through 1994 inclusive. Market capitalization is given by the year-end price multiplied by
the number of shares, and it is in billions of Malaysian ringgit.
The percentage of market capitalization to total capitalization for the politicallyaffiliated group increased from 6 percent in 1985 (RM. 3.5 billion) to 21 percent in 1994
(RM. 103.53 billion). The percentage for the independent group was 5.38 percent in

1985 (RM. 3.37 billion) and it dropped to its lowest point of 4.52 percent in 1989, but
then increased to 6.10 percent in 1994 (RM. 30.07 billion). The market capitalization
for politically-affiliated firms not only increased over the ten-year period but the
percentage to total market reached double digits from 1990 onwards.
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Table 1
Summary Statistics of Market Capitalization
(in RM. billion)

Percentage
to total

inarlcet
1985

58.3

3.50

6.00

3.37

5.78

1986

64.5

3.15

4.88

3.42

5.30

1987

73 .9

3.55

4.80

4.04

5.47

1988

98.7

5.33

5.40

7.09

7.18

1989

156. l

10.48

6.71

7.06

4.52

1990

131.7

13 .55

10.29

6.87

5.22

1991

161.3

25 .60

15 .87

7.99

4.95

1992

245 .8

38.20

15 .54

12.12

4.93

1993

328.5

59.23

18.55

20.70

6.30

1994

493 .0

101.31

20.55

30.07

6.10

Source: Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange Annual Companies Handbook
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Table 2A presents the summary statistics of profitability performance measures
for firms in the politically-affiliated group, matching independent group, and fully
independent group during the whole sample period, and also during the two separate
sub-periods. There is little difference in the mean and median values of return on
asset (ROA) between the politically-affiliated business group and the two independent
groups. In contrast, the return on equity (ROE) is significantly higher for the fully
independent group as compared to the politically-affiliated business group during the
whole sample period. The summary statistic for the whole period suggests that even
though the accounting definition of profit is much higher for the fully independent group
than the politically-affiliated group, there is no significant difference in the economic
definition of profit between the two groups. Thus, it could mean that the investors are
indifferent with respect to their economic expectations of the two groups.
The first investment measure I calculated for the entire sample period and the
two sub-periods suggests that there is no significant difference between the politicallyaffiliated business group and the two independent groups. Additionally, the results for
the first financing decisions measured for the whole sample period, the first sub-period
and the second sub-period suggest that the politically-affiliated business group has a
significantly higher first financing measure than do the independent groups in the sample,
at 1 percent significance level, but the second financing measure shows little or no
significant difference between the three groups in the sample.
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Table 2A
Sununary Statistics
The first line reports the mean values while the second line reports the median values. Standard deviation of
mean is reported in parentheses. The differences in mean is tested using Wilcoxon 2-sample Test. The t-statistic
ta statistics refers to mean differences between politically-affiliated group and matching independent group.
Tue t-statistic lb refers to mean differences between politically-affiliated firms and fully independent group.
Statistical significance at the 1 and 5 percent levels are denoted by ** and * respectively.

Var.

a

Pol.-affiliated

Matching Ind.

Fully Ind.

ta

~

PROFIT ABILITY PERFORMANCE

ROA

ROE

R*

0.022(0.051)
0.034

Whole Period: 1985-1994
0.009(0.291)
0.046
1.526

0.026(0.162)
0.032

1.675

0.021(0.108)
0.023

-0.117(1.814)
0.071

1.397

0.044(0.202)
0.053

6.185**

0.058(0.069)
0.043

0.057(0.559)
-0. 121

1.354

0.062(0.594)
0.047

0.177

First Sub-period: 1985-1989
ROA

ROE

R*

0.045(0.123)
0.045

0.054(0.079)
0.054

1.002

0.033(0.239)
0.047

0.072

0.054(0.236)
0.125

0.071 (0.356)
0.082

0.601

0.069(0.112)
0.071

5.046*

-0.042(0.395)
-0.069

-0.095(0.534)
-0.113

3.475*

0.155(0.068)
0.121

4.056*

Second Sub-period: 1990-1994
ROA

ROE

R*

0.045(0.123)
0.045

(l

054(0 079)
0.054

1002

0.033(0.239)
0.047

0.072

0.054(0.236)
0.125

0.071 (0 .356)
0.082

0.601

0.069(0. 112)
0.07 1

5.046*

-0.042(0.395)
-0.069

-0.095(0.534)
-0.113

3.475*

0. 155(0.068)
0.12 1

4.056*
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FINANCING MEASURES

Whole Period : 1985-1994
FINI

FIN2

0.478(0.186)
0.473

0.404(0.173)
0.403

5. 195**

0.396(0.1 76)
0.302

6.341 **

0.833(0.362)
0.995

0.859(0.344)
0.994

0. 152

0.852(0.346)
0.999

1.459

0.474(0.167)
0.449

0.088(0.003)
0.082

17.593**

0.069(0.007)
0.065

15.903**

0. 778(0.407)
0.998

0.868(0.334)
0.999

1.420

0.823(0.372)
0.998

0.086

0.479(0.198)
0.482

0.414(0. 162)
0.4 11

5.963**

0.411(0.178)
0.409

4.503**

0.866(0.328)
0.999

0.854(0.351)
0.999

0.812

0.869(0.329)
0.999

1.097

First Sub-Period: 1985-1989
FINI

FIN2

Second Sub-Period: 1990-1994
FINI

FIN2

INVESTMENT MEASURES

Whole Period : 1985-1994
INV!

2.135(3.93 1)
0.021
INV2 0.392(0.225)
0.363

2.105(2.145)
0.03 1
0.096(0.231)
0.042

0.936
7.386**

2.159(3.783)
0.017
0.299(0.234)
0.258

0.902
5.827**

First Sub-Period: 1985-1989
INV!

INV2

2.896( 1.408)
0.023

3. 184(2 . 103)
0.078

1.192

3.369(2.050)
0.023

0.273

0.356(0.264)
0.361

0.389(0.220)
0.389

1.859

0.412(0.229)
0.390

1.84

Second Sub-Period: 1990-1994
INV!

INV2

1.788(5.633)
0.0 19

1.674(2. 945)
0.023

0. 113

1.159( 1.528)
0.001

0.096

0.412 (0 .229)
0.390

0.265(0.207)
0.233

8.262'

0.381 (0.222)
0.347

5.717**
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Table 2B presents the summary statistics of profitability performance, financing
measures and investment measures for the politically-affiliated group in the two subperiods. The result shows that even though ROA and ROE are lower in the second subperiod compared to the first sub-period for the politically-affiliated group, the marketadjusted return, the financing measure and the investment measure are significantly
higher during the second sub-period.
Table 2C provides the summary statistics of the independent variables for the
whole sample period and the two sub-periods. The liquidity results show that the
politically-affiliated group generally has lower liquidity compared to the independent
groups. In contrast, Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein ( 1991) found that keiretsu firms are
more liquid than independent firms. Yoshihara's (1988) claim that the politicallyaffiliated business group has easy access to bank loans cannot be empirically supported in
this study. Thus, it appears from the table that firms in the politically-affiliated business
group not only did not enjoy higher liquidity than other independent groups in the
sample, but they are also more liquidity constrained than fully independent group. From
the financing decision measure results, it may be hypothesized that the politicallyaffiliated business group prefers to have long term obligations rather than short term
loans, which, in a way, may mitigate the agency costs of free cash flow 45 •

45

Jensen's (1986) agency cost of free cash flow assumed that managers act in their own interest to the
detriment of shareholders' interests. He defined free cash flow as "cash flow in excess of that required to
fund all projects that have positive net present values when discounted at the relevant cost of capital.'.
Thus debt obligations may mitigate the agency cost of free cash flow since debt obligations forced
managers to put aside cash and not waste it on other inefficiencies.
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However, comparative analysis of the two sub-periods for the politicallyaffiliated business group suggests that the group enjoyed significantly higher liquidity
during the second sub-period than the first sub-period. Since the profitability
performance measure indicates that the politically-affiliated group obtained higher profits
in the second sub-period, based on pecking order theory, the liquidity should also be
higher in the second sub-period for the politically-affiliated group.
Nevertheless, a comparative analysis of the summary statistics between the
politically-affiliated group and independent groups may not provide any concrete results,
since we must take into consideration the effect of other independent variables on a
firm's profitability performance, investment decisions and financing decisions. Thus, in
order to examine these three issues, we must control for each of the independent
variables. The following regression analyses will examine the differences in profitability
performance, financing behavior and investment decision between the politicallyaffiliated group and the two independent groups. Additionally, a dummy variable used to
represent the politically-affiliated group in a full sample regression analysis. The analysis
will be conducted to examine the effect of political-affiliation on profitability
performance, financing and investment decisions.
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Table 2B
Summary Statistics for Politically-Affiliated Group in Two Sub Periods

This table presents mean and median values used in this study. The sample consists of 350 finn-year
observations each for politically-affiliated business group in two sub periods, 1985-89 and 1990-1994.
The first line reports the mean values while the second line reports the median values. Standard
deviation of mean is reported in parentheses. lbe differences in mean is tested using Wilcoxon 2-sample
Test. The t-statistics tests the mean differences between the two sub-periods. Statistical significance at
the 1and5 percent levels are denoted by** and* respectively.
First sub-period (1985-1989)

Var.

mean

Second sub-period ( 1990-1994)

median

mean

median

t-test

PROFITABILITY PERFORMANCE
ROA

0.045(0.123)

0.045

0.008(0.165)

0.025

6.691 **

ROE

0.054(0.236)

0.125

0.029(0.008)

0.052

5.278*

R*

-0.042(0.395)

-0.069

0.345(0.056)

0.199

14.123*

FINI

0.474(0.167)

FINANCING MEASURES
0.479(0.198)
0.449

0.482

0.3 51

FIN2

0.778(0.407)

0.998

0.866(0.328)

0.999

2.454**

INVI

2.896(1.408)

INVESTMENT MEASURES
0.023
1.788(5.633)

0.019

1.914

INV2

0.356(0.264)

0.390

3.080**

0.361

0.412 (0.229)
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Table 2C
Summary Statistics for Independent Variables
The first line reports the mean values while the second line reports the median values. Standard deviation of
mean is reported in parentheses. The differences in mean is tested using Wilcoxon 2-sample Test. The t-statistic
ta statistics refers to mean differences between politically-affiliated group and matching independent group.
Tue t-statistic ti, refers to mean differences between politically-affiliated firms and fully independent group.
Statistical significance at the l and 5 percent levels are denoted by ** and *respectively.
Var.

a

Pol.-affiliated

Matching Ind.

ta

Fully Ind.

tb

Whole Period: 1985-1994
LIQ

Size

GRW

Q

CVl

CV2

Beta

LIQ

Size

GRW

Q

CVl

CV2

Beta

9.259(1 .622)
9.667

9.263(1.610)
9.417

0 .544

11.33(1.122)
11.376

7.810**

11.68( 1.342)
11.602

11.57(1.272)
11 .634

0.969

8.547(1.2)
8.722

8.719**

0.071(0.841)
0.058

0 .009(0 .959)
0 .063

0 .194

-0 .010(0.829)
0.052

0.146

0.645(0.186)
0.654

0.519(0.186)
0 .535

2.046*

0.469(0.20 l)
0.472

3.124**

0.781(0.328)
0.613

1.002(0.414)
0 .988

4.545**

0.816 (0 .462)
0 .698

7.315**

0.339(0.416)
0.376

0.447(0.482)
0.416

5.461**

0.288(0.327)
0.204

9.57**

0.986(0.451)
1.009

1.068(0.354)
1.062

0.361

1.057(0.344)
1.068

0.470

8.541(1 .254)
8.449

First Sub-period: 1985-1989
8. 794( 1.452)
1.784
8.860

10.92(1.144)
10.857

3.093**

10.979( 1.157)
10.942

10.41(1.175)
10.33

0.603

10.221 ( 1.1 49)
10.432

1.704

-0.007(0.89 1)
0.045

0 .038( 1.0 19)
0.089

3.987*

-0 . 111 (0.954)
0 .06 3

0.035

0.556(0 .15 I )
0.594

0 .547(0 .305)
0.489

0.669

0.449(0 .192)
0.431

23 .646* *

0 547(0 .304)
0.489

0 .636(0 .351 )
0 .594

4.482*

0.673(0. 305)
0 .588

3.569

0.347(0.456)
0. 311

0.4 13(0 33 1)
0 .299

2.1 63

0 .311 (0 23 2)
0 .235

4.108**

1.009 (0 .4 38)
1.068

1.0 17 (0354)
1.057

0.0 14

1.065(0 342)
1.009

0.922
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LIQ

Size

GRW

Q

CV!

CV2

Beta

9.70 1( 1.667)
9.855

Second Sub-~riod : 1990- 1994
9.576(1.62 1)
11.57(1.039)
9.864
0.367
11.62

5.669**

12.11 (1.267)
12.03

12. 18(1.244)
12.07

0.461

8.763(1.187)
8.901

5.867**

0.094(0.924)
0.065

0.015(0.044)
0.871

0.677

-0.071 (0.822)
0.026

1.443

0.539(0.204)
0.56 1

0.513(0. 181)
0.532

1.823

0.481(0.206)
0.491

3.633**

0. 542(0.403)
0.346

0.8 1(0.375)
0.693

7.913**

0.642(0.437)
0.585

8.6 19**

0.33 1(0.468)
0.376

0.391(0.305)
0.299

2.280*

0.299(0.261)
0.232

5.92**

0.972(0.459)
0. 928

1.0 14(0.3 54)
1.062

0.699

1.052(0.346)
1.009

1.374
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Cross-Sectional Regression Analysis
Profitability Performance Measures
Table 3 presents the cross-sectional regression analysis results on the profitability
performance measure for the politically-affiliated business group, matching independent
group, and fully independent group for the whole sample period from 1985 to 1994, and
also for the two sub-periods. In particular, this study is interested in the differences in the
determinants of profitability performance, investment behavior and financing behavior
between the politically-affiliated group and the two independent groups in the sample.
The three profitability performance models produce different results. For the
politically-affiliated group, only the explanatory variables for the market-adjusted return
model have the expected signs. The coefficient of the size variable is negative and
significant; the coefficient for the risk measure is positive and significant; and the
coefficient for the liquidity variable is positive and significant. This is consistent with
previous studies. Jensen and Meckling (1976) presented their argument that size should
be negatively related to profitability, since the larger the firm size, the higher the agency
cost, thus the lower the profitability expected. While both the risk-premium hypothesis
and the pecking order theory suggest a positive relation between risk and profitability.
Ironically, when ROA is used as the dependent variable, all the explanatory
appear with signs opposite of what would be expected and are significant. For the ROE
model, only the liquidity variable appears with the correct positive sign and is significant.
Thus, even though the three measures are indicators of profitability performance, there
could be different interpretations of determinants of accounting profit and economic
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profit. The results for the ROA model are that the coefficient for size is positive and
significant, while the coefficients for risk and liquidity are negative and significant. The
inference is that asset-utilization is more efficient by the larger firms than the smaller
firms, since the larger the firm, the higher the return generated from asset. The results
further suggest that firms with risky operations tend to have a smaller return on assets.
The negative relation between liquidity and ROA may indicate the presence of the
agency cost of free cash flow within the politically-affiliated group. According to
Jensen's (1986) agency cost of free cash flow theory, managers act in their own interest
to the detriment of shareholders' interests. They would utilize the free cash flow, defined
as "cash flow in excess of that required to fund all projects that have positive net present
values when discounted at the relevant cost of capital'', to indulge in wasteful activities,
such as taking on projects with negative net present value, with the sole purpose of
increasing their pecuniary benefits. Nevertheless, since the purpose of this study is not to
test the agency cost of free cash flow, the discussion on the agency cost of free cash flow
will be limited to the negative relation between liquidity and return on asset.
Results for the fully independent group show that only the market-adjusted return
model provides a similar result as the politically-affiliated group; the explanatory
variables appear with the expected signs and they are all significant. While only two
explanatory variables (i.e., size and risk) in the market-adjusted return model for the
matching independent group appear with the correct signs (i.e. , negative and positive
respectively) and are significant.
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The whole sample period analysis indicates that after controlling for growth, size,
risk and liquidity, the industry dummy Dl for all three groups in the sample has a
negative and significant coefficient when ROA is used as a profitability performance
measure, thus indicating a significantly lower performance when firms are in the
industrial grouping46 1. However, for firms in industrial grouping 3, the coefficient is
negative and significant only for the matching and fully independent groups, while the
coefficient for the politically-affiliated group is also negative but insignificant.
When ROE is used as the profitability performance measure, the coefficient for
the dummy D2 is negative and significant for the fully independent group but positive
and significant for the politically-affiliated group, indicating firms in the politicallyaffiliated group in the plantation and mining sectors are able to earn significantly higher
returns on their equity, i.e., about 7 percent more, than other sectors in the same group.
While in the fully independent group, firms in the same sector groupings obtained 13 .5
percent less returns on their equity than firms in other sectors in the fully independent
group.
When market-adjusted return is used as the profitability performance measure,
the coefficients of the two dummy variables become negative and significant for the
politically-affiliated business but not for the other independent groups. For the
politically-affiliated group, firms in the industrial products, construction and properties
sectors (i.e., Group 2) earn significantly higher returns than firms in the other sectors.

46

Group l consists of three industries, i.e., consumer products, trading services and hotels; Group 2
consists of three industries, i.e., industrial products, construction and properties; Group 3 consists of two
industries, i.e., plantation and mining. The dummy variables are represented by 01and02, where 01 is
1 if group is equal to I and zero otherwise; and 02 is 1 if group is equal to 3 and zero othenvise.
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This result can be expected since the two largest firms in the sample, i.e., Renong and
United Engineers, are in the construction sectors. These firms are able to earn higher
market-adjusted returns because they are on the frontier of most government
privatization projects. The sub-period analyses also provide similar results. However, the
result for the independent groups shows just the opposite. Independent firms in the two
independent groups earn significantly higher returns only if they are in the consumer
products, trading services, hotels, plantation and mining sectors.
The results on the profitability performance provide similar evidence. First, there
seems to be no difference in behavior between politically-affiliated group and fully
independent group under the market-adjusted return model. The hypothesis that the
politically-affiliated group exhibits different profitability performance cannot be
supported. The signs of the determinants of the model are as expected and they are all
significant.
However, under the market-adjusted return model, the matching independent
group does not seem to exhibit similar behavior to the politically-affiliated group .
Growth affects profitability in a positive and significant way, while liquidity affects
profitability in a negative and significant way. Thus, the economic assertion is that, when
a firm has growth prospects, the stock market reacts positively, but the higher liquidity
position of a firm implies a lower market-adjusted return. Unlike the politically-affiliated
group, evidence of agency cost of free cash flow in the matching independent group is
reflected in the economic definition of profit rather than in the accounting definition of
profit.
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Table 3
Profitabilitv Performance Regression Results for the Whole Sample Period 1985-1994

This table presents cross-sectional regression results for profitability performance measure for the period 1985-1994 based on five-year average of ROA, ROE
and R *. The regression model is defined by the three performance measures used. Risk is defined by the coefficient of variation of annual changes in net sales.
Adjustments are made to correct for heteroskedasticity following White (1980). Absolute values oft-statistics are in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1
and 5 percent levels are denoted by ** and * respectively.
Ind. var
ROA

-..J
0

Matching Independent

Politically-affiliated

--a

ROE

R*

ROA

ROE

Fully Independent
R*

ROA

ROE

R*

Intercept

-0.139
(-3.254)**

-0.427
(6.062)••

-1.243
(-5.531)••

0.040
(0.975)

-0.991
(-4.484)**

0.910
(4.64)**

-0.096
(-4.996)**

-0.288
(-3.816)**

1.079
(4 .88)**

SIZE

0.032
(5 .332)**

0.013
(l.230)

-0.082
(-4.577)**

-0.009
(-1.063)

0.012
(0.326)

-0.068
(-2.343)*

-0.002
(-0.572)

0.036
(1.985)*

-0.198
(-5.965)**

RISK

-0.062
(-8. 503)**

-0.070
(-5.799)**

0.185
(5.495)**

-0.'.211
(-7.595)**

-0.082
(-'.2.37)*

0.19'.2
(7.979)**

-0.137
(-16.951)**

-0. 135
(-'.2.802)**

0.151
(4.272)**

LIQ

-0.015
(-2.636)**

0.035
(3.664)**

0.009
(0.704)

0.031
(3 .765)••

0.106
(3.343)*•

-0.186
(-7.234)**

0.0416
(9.8'.29)**

0.038
(2.230)*

0.118
(3.989)**

DI

-0.029
(-4.045)**

0.011
(0 .936)

-0.06'.2
(-2.336)*

-0.063
(-4.576)**

0.115
(2.304)*

0.128
(4.885)**

-0.023
(-6.773)**

-0.090
(-6.140)**

0.066
(2.64)**

02

-0.0 13
(-1.532)

0.0740
(5.154)**

-0.058
(-1.62'.2)

-0.079
(-4.038)**

0.079
(1.460)

0.286
(5 .75)**

-0.071
(-14.216)**

-0.135
(-5 .948)**

0.264
(6.53)**

0.50
54.97••
35

0.58
58.01 **
35

0.48
55.47••
35

0.49
61.49*•
35

0.46
66.08••
35

0.4'.2
44.58 ..
35

0.61
73.88**
35

0.63
77.32••
35

0.69
87.79**
35

-

Adjusted R
F-statistic
Sampl.: size

s"c Appendix I for defmition of variables

Table 3 (continue)
Profitability Performance Regression Results for the First Sub Period 1985 -1989

This table presents cross-sectional regression results for profitability performance measure for the period 1985-1989 based on five-year average of ROA, ROE
and R *. The regression model is defined by the three performance measures used. Risk is defined by the coefficient of variation of annual changes in net sales.
Adjustments are made to correct for heteroskedasticity following White ( 1980). Absolute values oft-statistics are in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1
and 5 percent levels arc denoted by ** and * respectively.
Ind. var

Matching Independent

Politically-affiliated
ROA

ROE

R*

ROA

ROE

Fully Independent
R*

ROA

ROE

R*

Intercept

-0.357
(-8.416)**

-0.780
(-7.559)**

-0.097
(-0 .608)

-0.002
(-0.057)

-0.389
(-4.337)**

-0.289
(-3.479)**

-0.121
(-2.85)**

-0.869
(-6.352)**

-0.728
(-7.089)**

SIZE

0.024
(3.465)**

0.061
(3 .051)**

-0.104
(-4.803)**

-0.042
(-7.22)**

-0.110
(-4.717)**

-0.024
(-2.465)*

-0.009
(-1.713)

0.032
(2.389)*

0.0438
(3.822)**

RISI..:

0.048
(6.786)**

0. 139
(6. 18)**

0.100
(4.019)**

0.031
(5. 35)**

0.078
(3.519)**

0.047
(3.819)**

0.008
( 12.52)**

0.108
(5 .900)**

0.068
(2.603)**

LIQ

0.005
(1.031)

-0.00 1
(-0.046)

-0.060
(-3 . 105)**

0.064
(12.053)**

0.187
(6.29)**

-0.007
(-0.714)

0.061
(8 .058)**

0.103
(3.951)**

-0.029
(-2 .719)* *

DI

0.016
(2.105)*

0.154
(4.888)**

-0.098
(-4.056)**

0.003
(0.598)

0.013
(0.647)

-0.041
(-1.65)

-0.042
(-4.645)**

-0.162
(-7.036)**

-0.006
(-0.496)

02

0.062
(10.923 )**

0. 221
(5.473)**

-0.063
(-2.269)*

0.062
(8.009)**

0.197
(6.06)**

-0.162
(-6.426)**

-0.047
(-6.6 16)**

-0.142
(-5.447)**

0.039
(2.64)**

0.45
41.69**
35

0.43
48.99**
35

0.38
27.77**
35

0.54
86.02**
35

0.56
94.41 **
35

0.62
98.11 **
35

0.58
83.45**
35

0.60
95 .94**
35

0.66
118.68**
35

-..J

-

Adjusted R
F-stati;.tic
Sample size

Table 3 (continue)
Profitability Perfonnance Regression Results for the Second Sub Period 1990 - 1994
This table presents cross-sectional regression results for profitability performance measure for the period 1990-1994 based on five-year average of ROA, ROE
and R *. The regression model is defined by the three performance measures used. Risk is defined by the coefficient of variation of annual changes in net sales.
Adjustments are made to correct for heteroskedasticity following White (1980) . Absolute values oft-statistics are in parentheses. Statistical significance at the
1 and 5 percent levels are denoted by ** and * respectively.
Ind. Var
ROA

---l
tv

Matching Independent

Politically-affiliated
ROE

R*

ROA

ROE

Fully Independent
R*

ROA

ROE

R*

Intercept

-0.044
(-0.848)

-1.002
(-9.93)**

-0.844
(-1.616)

-0.002
(-0.057)

-0.389
(-4.337)**

-0.289
(-3.479)**

-0.142
(-4.327)**

-1.221
(-3.928)**

2.533
(7.989)**

SIZE

-0.003
(-0.402)

0.073
(7.488)**

-0.091
(-2.12 1)*

-0.042
(-7.229)**

-0.11
(-4.717)**

0.024
(2.465)*

0.015
(3.317)**

0.203
(4.632)**

-0.105
(-2.523)**

RISK

0.0608
(8.387)**

0.115
(8.364)**

0.269
(5.259)**

0.031
(5.349)**

0.078
(3.519)**

0.047
(3.819)**

0.036
(9.056)**

0.014
(0.712)

0.204
(3.446)**

LIQ

0.004
(0.775)

0.012
(1.266)

0.018
(0.450)

0.064
(12.053)**

0.180
(6.29)**

-0.007
(-0.714)

0.017
(5.984)**

-0.083
(-3 .915)**

-0.115
(-1.795 )

DI

-0.042
(-5.164)**

-0.021
(-2.148)*

-0.010
(-0.130)

0.003
(0.599)

0.014
(0.647)

-0.041
(-1.651)

-0.004
(-1.218)

-0.029
(-1.952)*

-0.01
(-0.285)

02

-0.011
(-1.068)

0.055
(2.81 9)**

-0.188
(-1.666)

0.062
(8.009)**

0.197
(6.063)**

-0.162
(-6.426)**

-0.038
(-8.661)**

-0.128
(-5.646)**

0.495
(9.251)**

0.47
54.24**
35

0.48
54.33**
35

0.43
34.02**
35

0.53
86.02**
35

0.50
69.61**
35

0.52
76.12••
35

0.52
68.38**
35

0.59
76.96**
35

0.49
60.36**
35

-

Adjusted R
F-stati;tic
Sample si z.e

Financing Behavior Measures
Table 4 presents the regression results for the financing behavior models for the
whole sample period, the first sub-period and the second sub-period. Results for the
whole sample period indicated that the politically-affiliated group exhibits different
financing behavior than do the two independent groups.
When the first financing decision measure is used (i.e., FINI), the size coefficient
has the expected sign (positive) and it is significant for all groups in the sample.
This is consistent with the study done by Chang and Rhee ( 1990) that well-established
firms have easy access to the capital markets compared to smaller and less-established
firms. When the second decision measure is used, the size coefficient is again positive
and significant for the two independent groups but not for the politically-affiliated group.
The politically-affiliated group has a negative and significant coefficient for the size
variable, which lends support to the previous study by Titman and Wessels ( 1988) that
small firms are more leveraged and prefer to use short term loans rather than issueing
long term debt.
The coefficient for growth variable is positive and significant for the politicallyaffiliated group but negative and significant for the fully independent group. The result
for the politically-affiliated group is consistent with the pecking order theory that rapid
growth implies a higher debt capacity and an ability to pay interests, and lenders may
charge a lower cost to the firm with sound future prospects. In contrast, results for
independent groups are consistent with the hypothesis of the study which is based on the
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theory of agency cost presented in previous studies [Titman and Wessels (1988); Jensen
and Meckling (1976); Myer (1977); and Stulz (1990)].
Result for the risk measure shows a positive and significant relation between risk
and financing for the politically-affiliated group but not for the independent group. Thus
the hypothesis that high operating risk firms prefers to use more leverage can only be
supported for the politically-affiliated group. The inference is that, banks may be
reluctant to extend loans to firms in the independent groups with high operating risk.
However, the same inference may not hold true for the politically-affiliated group, since
firms in that group are known to help out one another in times of financial distress or
impending financial distress. The positive relation between risk and financing may
suggest that the assistance could be in the form of increased financing.
The results for the liquidity measure are mixed. When the first financing measure
is used, the results support the hypothesis of a negative relation between liquidity and
financing for the politically-affiliated and matching independent group. However, the
liquidity measure coefficient is positive and significant for politically-affiliated group and
fully independent group when percentage of interest-bearing loans is used as an
alternative financing measure. The inference is that when liquidity is high, interestbearing loans, including short term loans, are more preferred than long-term loans to
finance investments. This may be because short term obligations can easily be met with
internal fund .
When the second financing measure is used (i.e., FIN2), the dummy variable for
industrial group 3 for the whole sample period is similar for all three groups in the
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sample; the coefficient for dummy variable D2 is negative and significant which indicates
that firms in the plantation and mining sectors use significa ntly less interest-bearing loans
than firms in other sectors. The results are consistent throughout the two sub periods,
but not statistically significant for the politically-affiliated group in the first sub period
and not statistically significant for the fully independent group in the second sub period.
In contrast, when the first financing measure is used, the coefficient for D2 is positive for
all three groups in the sample, but not statistically significant for the matching
independent group. The inference is that firms in the plantation and mining sector prefer
to use long-term debt rather than short-term loan.
Results for the whole sample period show that the dummy variable coefficients

(D 1) are not significant. But results for the matching independent group in the first subperiod for the first and second financing measures, are negative and significant, and
positive and significant, respectively, indicating firms in the D 1 industrial grouping prefer
to use more interest-bearing loans but less long term liabilities than firms in other sectors.
This indicates that during the first sub period, only firms in the different industrial
groupings in the matching independent group has significantly different financing
behavior. While the politically-affiliated group shows no significant differences in
financing behavior between the industrial groups. Generally, the results for financing
decisions measure support the hypothesis that the politically-affiliated group exhibits
different financing behavior than the independent group.
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Table 4
Financing Behavior Regression Results for the Whole Sample Period (1985 - 1994)
This table presents cross-sectional regression results for financing behavior measure for fmns in the politically-affiliated business, matched independent group, and fully
independent group, for the period 1985-1 994 based on ten-year average of FINI, and FIN2. The regression model is defined by the two financing behavior measures used. GRW
is defined by annual compound growth rate in total assets. Risk is defined by the coefficient of variation of annual changes in net sales. Adjustments are made to correct for
heteroskedasticity following White ( 1980). Absolute values of t-statistics are in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1 and 5 percent levels are denoted by •• and •
respectively.
Ind. Var
FINI

-..J
0\

Matching Independent

Politically-affiliated
FIN2

FINI

FIN2

Fully Independent
FINI

FIN2

Intercept

-0 .136 (-3 .935 )**

1.063 (8.279)**

0.095 ( 1.565)

-0.197 (-1.262)

0.037 (l.004)

-0.648 (-3.925 )**

GRW

0.092 (7 .759)**

0.044 (0.892)

-0.086 (-3.285)**

-0.244 (-3.757)**

0.007 (0 .369)

-0.329 (4.351)**

SIZE

0.030 (5.404 )**

-0.118 (-10.808)**

0.019 (2.504 )*

0.11 (4.957)**

0.002 (0.279)

0.048 (2 .269)*

RlSK

0.006 (0.877)

0.046 (2.878)**

-0.026 (-3 .511)**

-0.112 (-2.547)**

-0 .041 (-8.831 )**

-0.089 (-3 .715 )**

LIQ

-0 .165 (-3.518 )**

0.131 (9.794)**

-0.029 (-5 .181)**

-0.022 (-0.927)

0.001 (0.176)

0.063 (3.281 )**

DI

0.005 ( l.003 )

0.012 (0.679)

-0.002 (-0.183)

0.031 (l.308)

-0.007 (-1.363)

0.039 ( 1. 776)

D2

0.025 (3.465)**

-0 .168 (-5 .669)**

0.023 (l.811)

-0.316 (-5 .544)**

0.026 (4 .055)**

-0.144 (4 .132)**

Adjusted Ri
F-Statistic
Sample size

0. 87
382 .7**
35

0.58
83 .23**
35

0.72
97.32**
35

0.55
47 .11 **
35

0.71
93.41 **
35

0.53
43.02**
35

Table 4 (continue)
Financing Behavior Regression Results for the First Sub-Period (1985 - 1989)
This table presents cross-sectional regression results for financing behavior measure for fums in the politically-affiliated business, matched independent group, and fully
independent group, for Ille period 1985-1989 based on five-year average of FINI, and FIN2. The regression model is defined by the two financing behavior measures used. GRW
is defined by annual compound growth rate in total assets. Risk is defined by the coefficient of variation of annual changes in net sales. Adjustments are made to correct for
hcterosko::dasticity follO\\~ng White ( 1980). Absolute values of t-statistics are in parentheses. Statistical significance at the I and 5 percent levels are denoted by ** and •
respectively.
Ind. Var

Poli ti call y-affiliated
FINI

-...J
-...J

FIN2

Matching Independent
FINI

FIN2

Fully Independent
FINI

FIN2

Intercept

-0.00 I (-0.008)

-0.509 (-1.204)

1.020 (7.740)**

0.214 (0.630)

0.039 (0.490)

-1.077 (-4.703)* *

GRW

0.048 (4.437)**

-0 .221 (-3.4 13)**

0.170 (6.080)**

0.025 (0.475)

0.029 (2.476)*

-0.236 (-4.509)* *

SIZE

-0 .04 1 (-3.783)**

-0.289 (-4.205 )**

-0.071 (-4.841)**

0.079 (1.513)

0.008 (0.740)

0.064 (3.033)**

RJSK

0.033 (2.624)**

0.544 (6.36 1)**

0.067 (2.054)*

-0.425 (-4.620)**

-0 .067 (-3.279)**

0.004 (0.079)

LIQ

0.055 (5.457)**

0.441 (5.989)**

-0.001 (-0.080)

-0.022 (-0.468)

-0.009 (-1.008)

0.094 (4.313)**

DI

-0.013 (-1.444)

-0.053 (-1.406)

-0.141 (-4.321)* *

0.129 (3.264 )**

-0.048 (-4.604)**

0.042 (1.169)

D2

0.014 (1.414)

-0.033 (-1.406)

-0.082 (-2.401)*

-0.287 (-3.621 )**

-0.006 (-0.497)

-0.267 (-4 .068)**

Adjusted R.l
f.'-Statistic
Sampk size

0.95
236 .2 **
35

0.61
18.9 1**
35

0.71
39.92**
35

0.52
18.07**
35

0.86
102.23**
35

0.76
54.40**
35

Table 4 (continue)
Financing Behavior Regression Results for the Second Sub-Period (1990 - 1994)
This table presents cross-sectional regression results for financing behavior measure for firms in the politically-affiliated business, matched independent group, and fully
independent group, for the period 1990-1994 based on five-year average of FINI, and FIN2. The regression model is defined by the two financing behavior measures used. GRW
is defmed by annual compound growth rate in total assets. Risk is defined by the coefficient of variation of annual changes in net sales. Adjustments are made to correct for
heteroskedasticity following White (1980). Absolute values oft-statistics are in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1 and 5 percent levels are denoted by ** and *
respectively.
fad. Var

Politically-affiliated
FINl

FIN2

Matching Independent
FINI

FIN2

Fully Independent
FINI

FIN2

fatercept

-0.068 (-1.250)

-0.05 1 (-0.315)

-0.160 (-2.006)*

-0.567 (-1.859)

0.069 (l.390)

-0.890 (-3 .291 )**

GRW

0.043 (3.834 )* *

0.006 (0.163)

-0. I 19 (-3 .673)**

-0.439 (-5.343)**

0.073 (2.470)*

-0.223 (-1. 81 9)

SIZE

0.001 (0.157)

0.048 (2.852)* *

0.028 (3.953)**

0.095 (3.747)**

0.009 (1.404)

0.076 (2.415)*

RISK

-0.007 (-0.608)

0.02 I (0.485)

-0.046 (-5.364)**

-0.056 (-1.155)

-0.053 (-9.708)**

-0.106 (-2.900)**

LIQ

0.011 (2.009)*

0.011 (0.609)

-0.018 (-3. 548)**

0.023 (1.023)

-0.0 15 (-2.446)*

0.064 (2.382)*

DI

0.003 (0.402)

-0.013 (-0.578)

-0.018 (-0. 173)

-0.048 (-1.285)

0.009 (1.015)

0.077 (2.773)**

D2

0.053 (5.664 )**

-0.186 (-3.512)**

0.049 (2.716)**

-0.212 (-2.368)*

0.03 1 (2.570)**

-0.085 (-1.487)

0.93
247.84**
35

0.46
16.62**
35

0.79
69.58**
35

0.42
14.08**
35

0.90
151.5**
35

0.69
39.68**
35

.....:i

00

1.

Adjusted R
F-Statistic
Sample size

Investment Decisions Behavior
The results in Table 5 provides one interesting result. In the whole sample
regression results, the coefficient for liquidity measure is positive and significant for both
investment measures for the politically-affiliated business and matching independent
group, and positive and significant for fully independent group for th second investment
measure. This result is consistent with Meyer and Kuh's (1957) findings that liquidity is a
powerful determinant of investment. Thus, the hypothesis of this study that liquidity is
not an important determinant for investment for the politically-affiliated group is not
supported, since the coefficient of the liquidity variable for all three groups in the sample
enters is positive and significant, for the whole sample period and, also, for most47 of the
first and second sub-periods. The inference is that liquidity is still a very important
determinant of investment for all groups in the sample regardless of their groupaffiliation.
The results of the growth measure regression are generally negative and
significant for all groups in the sample for the whole sample period and the first subperiod. This again does not support the hypothesis that the politically-affiliated group has
different investment behavior than the independent groups. Additionally, this result is
also inconsistent with previous findings of a positive relation between growth and
investment [Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein, ( 1991)]. The coefficient for growth

47

When the first investment measure is used, the coefficient for liquidity is negative and significant for
the politically-affiliated group in the first sub-period; and negative and significant for the politicallyaffiliatcd group and fully independent group for the second sub-period.
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measure is negative and significant for both investment measures for the politicallyaffiliated group but not for the independent groups.
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Table 5
Investment Behavior Regression Results for the Whole Sample Period (1985 - 1994)
This table presents cross-sectional regression results for investment behavior measure for firms in the politically-affiliated business, matched independent group, and fully
independent group, for the period 1985-1994 based on ten-year average of INVl , and INV2 . The regression model is defined by the two investment behavior measures used.
Risk is defined by coefficient of variation of annual percentage change in net operating income. GRW is defined by annual compound growth rate in total assets. Adjustments
are made to correct for heteroskedasticity following White (1980). Absolute values oft-statistics are in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1 and 5 percent levels are
denoted by ** and* respectively.

Ind. Var

Politically-affiliated
INV!

-

00

Matching Independent
INV2

INVl

Fully Independent
INV2

INVl

INV2

Intercept

-0.467 (-1.549)

-0.396 (-6.218)**

0.388 (l.129)

-0.303 (-2 .924)**

0.318 (2 .551)**

-0.372 (-4.734)**

GRW

-0 .886 (-3.9 12)**

-0.797 (-7.673)**

-0 .352 (-1.500)

-0.545 (-9 .179)**

-0.456 (-2.571 )**

-0 .021 (-0.420)

RISK

-0.898 (-4. 182 )**

0.030 (l.803)

-0.293 (-2 .097)*

-0 .039 (-2.077)*

0.326 (5.705)**

-0 .178 (-7.122)**

LIQ

0.225 (3.526)**

0.114 (10.859)**

0.151 (3.427)**

0.098 ( 11.241 )**

-0.496 (-2. 632)**

0.107 (11 .557)**

DJ

0.764 (3 .902)**

0.063 (2.879)**

-0.989 (-3.544)**

0.143 (4 .512)**

0.155 (5 .327)**

0.0 11 (0.487)

D2

0.056 (0.842)

0.179 (5.358)*

-0.939 (-3 .662)**

0.245 (6.174 )**

0.134 (0 .279)

0.223 (8.257)**

Adjusted R 2
F-Statistic
Sample size

0.39
38.84
35

0.25
30.25**
35

0.28
27.55**
35

0.45
45 .52**
35

0.27
26.33**
35

0.52
60.31 **
35

**

Table 5 (continue)
Investment Behavior Regression Results for the First Sub Period (1985 - 1989)
This table presents cross-sectional regression results for investment behavior measure for firms in the politically-affiliated business, matched independent group, and fully
independent group, for the period 1985-1989 based on five-year average of INVl, and INV2. The regression model is defined by the two investment behavior measures used.
Risk is defined by coefficient of variation of annual percentage change in net operating income. GRW is defined by annual compound growth rate in total assets. Adjustments
are made to correct for heteroskedasticity following White (1980). Absolute values oft-statistics are in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1 and 5 percent levels are
denoted by ** and* respectively.
Poli ti call y-affil iated

Ind. Var

INVl
00
N

Fully Independent

Matching Independent
JNV2

INVl

JNV2

JNVl

INY2

Intercept

0.217 (3.900)**

0.369 (2.588)**

0.148 (0.132)

0.125 (0.838)

0.698 (l.802)

-0.297 (-2 .287) *

GRW

-0.535 (-2 .009)*

-0.391 (-2.278)*

-2 .031 (-1.857)

-0.292 (-2 .839)**

0.136 (0.407)

-0.144 (-1.5 90)

RISK

0.386 (3 .517)**

-0.068 (-1.475)

-0.392 (-1.164)

-0.066 (-1.762)

0.855 (3 .517)**

-0.144 (-3.069 )**

LIQ

-0.225 (-3.651)**

0.025 (l.598)

0.359 (2.870)**

0.040 (2.623)**

-0.024 (-3 .827)**

0.099 (7.209)**

01

-0 .273 (-2.475)*

0.069 (-1.475)

-1.185 (-1.912)

0.154 (3.447)**

0.404 (3.717)**

0.082 (2.676)**

02

-0 .192 (-1.934)

0.079 (l.072)

-1.236 (-1.915)

0.232 (4.007)**

0.350 (2 .802)**

0.251 (6 .117)**

Adjusted R 2
F-Statistic
Sample size

0.26
8.61 **
35

0.24
8.19**
35

0.26
9.32 **
35

0.28
10.67**
35

0.17
5. 78**
35

0.35
14.54**
35

Table 5 (continue)
Investment Behavior Regression Results for the Second Sub Period (1990 - 1994)
This table presents cross-sectional regression results for investment behavior measure for finns in the politically-affiliated business, matched independent group, and fully
independent group, for the period 1990-1994 based on five-year average of INV!, and INV2. The regression model is defined by the two investment behavior measures used.
Risk is defined by coefficient of variation of armual percentage change in net operating income. GRW is defined by annual compound growth rate in total assets. Adjustments
are made to correct for heteroskedasticity following White (1980). Absolute values oft-statistics are in parentheses. Statistical significance at the I and 5 percent levels are
denoted by ** and * respectively.
Ind. Var

Politically-affiliated

Matching Independent

Fully Independent

INV!

INV2

INVl

Intercept

-1.244 (-0.655)

-0.244 (-1.763)

-2 .745 (-1. 161)

-0.312 (-2.023)*

-3.993(-1.305)

-0.194 (-1.678)

GRW

-1.421 (-3.303)**

-0.429 (-2.775)**

-0.661 (-0.720)

-0.493 (-6.513)**

-1.219 (-0.794)

-0.105 (-1.107)

RISK

-0.251 (-3.146)**

-0.046 (-1.795)

-0.829 (-2.396 )*

-0.118 (-5 .218)**

-1.245 (-1.562)

-0.186 (-4.357)**

LIQ

-0 .103 (2.640)**

0.083 (4.351 )**

1.011 (2.766) **

0.102 (8.688)**

0.724 (2.258)*

0.091 (7. 172)**

DI

0.229 (2.866)**

-0.007 (-0.213)

-1.392 (2.658)*

0.112 (2.664 )**

-0.119 (-0.1 53)

-0.004 (-0.111)

D2

0.155(1.860)

0.089 (1.213)

-0.285 (-2 .128)*

0.271 (4.594)**

3.204 (1.613)

0.194 (4.318)**

Adjusted R2
F-Statistic
Sample size

0.39
18.0 1**
35

0.27
10.49**
35

0.23
8.26**
35

0.49
26.61 **
35

0.21
8.48**
35

0.36
16.96**
35

00

w

INV2

INVl

INV2

All Samples Cross-Sectional Regression Analyses
Table 6 presents the results of the cross-sectional regression analysis for the
entire sample48 for the whole sample period and the two sub-periods. The models include
a new dummy variable G, where G is equal to 1 for politically-affiliated group and 0
otherwise.
The profitability performance models indicate that only some of the explanatory
variables for the market-adjusted return model appear with the expected signs and they
are all significant. The coefficient for the size variable is negative and significant for the
whole period and second sub-period; the coefficient for the risk variable is negative and
significant for the entire sample periods, while the coefficient for the liquidity variable is
positive and significant for the whole period and second sub-period. The dummy variable
for industrial classification does not provide any meaningful results, except for in the
second sub-period when the firms in industrial group 1 seem to obtain less marketadjusted returns, (i.e., about 12 percent less) than the firms in other industrial groups.
After controlling for the independent variables including the effect of industry
classification, the coefficient for the dummy variable G indicates that during the whole
sample period, firms in the politically-affiliated group managed to obtain significantly
higher market-adjusted returns (about 2 percent higher) than firms in the independent
group. This result is repeated in the second sub-period. Not only did the firms in the

48

The entire sample consists of 35 politically-affiliated firms, 35 matching independent firms and 35
fully independent firms. Since firms in the l\¥ 0 independent groups may be overlapped, the entire
sample consists of only 70 fim1s . In this section, the discussion is based on the entire sample which
consists of politically-affiliated firms and fully independent fimlS, even though two sets of results are
obtained, where the second sample consists politically-affiliated firms and matching independent firms .
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politically-affiliated group obtain significantly higher returns, they obtained about 26
percent higher than firms in the independent group. Thus, this result not only shows that
the politically-affiliated group obtained superior profitability performance compared to
independent group, it also provides support to the first hypothesis of the study.
Even though the coefficient for the dummy variable G for the ROA and ROE
models is not significant for the whole sample period and the two sub-periods, the
explanatory variables for the ROA model during the whole period are all significant. The
coefficient for the risk and liquidity variables even appear with their expected signs.
However, consistent with the result on Table 3A for the politically-affiliated group, the
coefficient for the size variable is again positive throughout the entire sample periods,
and also significant for the first sub-period, which provides further support to the
inference that asset-utilization is more efficient in larger firms than in smaller firms.

In summary, the first hypothesis of superior profitability performance for the
politically-affiliated group can only be supported in the market-adjusted return model but
not in the ROA and ROE models. This indicates that there is some significant difference
in the economic definition of profit between politically-affiliated group and independent
group. Apparently, the investors' expectation of politically-affiliated business group
seems to be higher than their expectation of independent group, despite the fact that
there is no difference in accounting definition of profits between the two groups.
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Table 6
Profitability Perfotmance Whole Sample Regression Results
'111is table presents cross-sectional regression results for profitability perfotmance measure for the whole sample for the whole sample period, 1985-1994, the first sub-period,
1985-1989, and the second sub-period, 1990-1994, based on average values of ROA, ROE and R*. The regression model is defined by the three perfotmance measures used.
Risk is defmed by the coefficient of variation of annual changes in net sales. Adjustments are made to correct for heteroskedasticity following White (1980). Absolute values of
t-statistics are in parentheses. Statistical significance at the I and 5 percent levels are denoted by** and •respectively.
Ind. Var

Whole Period (1985-1994)
ROA

R*

ROA

ROE

R*

Second Sub-period ( 1990-1994)
ROA

ROE

R*

Intercept

-0.174
(-5.103)**

-0 .3 11
(-2 .608) **

0.503
(2.661)**

-0.222
(-5.196)*

-0.363
(-2 .355)**

-0 .635
(-4.249)**

-0.182
(-3.23)**

-0 .9 11
(-3.807)**

2.597
(6 .047)**

SIZE

0.010
(2.469)**

0.001
(0.002)

-0.091
(-3.761)**

0.027
(4.493)**

0.027
( 1.213)

-0.004
(-0.167)

0.010
(1.583)

0.106
(3.890)**

-0 .173
(-3.467)**

RJSK

0.045
(10.875)**

0.065
(4.4 19)**

-0.165
(-7.050)**

-0.037
(-4.148)**

-0.141
(-4.350)**

-0.039
(-4.429)**

-0.055
(-6.047)**

-0.129
(-3.429)**

-0.623
(-8.008)**

LIQ

0.023
(5 .705)**

0.059
(4 .219)**

0.065
(2.921)**

0.009
(l.503)

0.040
(l.702)

0.032
( 1.408)

0.013
(2.300)

-0.018
(-0.736)

0.024
(0.527)*

Dl

-0.026
(-5.414)**

-0.038
(-2 .279)*

-0.005
(-0.188)

-0.009
(-1.151)

0.045
(1.631)

-0.017
(-0.672)

-0.018
(-2.259)*

-0.028
(-0.787)

-0.121
(-1.945)*

D2

-0 .0 17
(-2.726)**

-0.007
(-0.324)

0.055
(l.522)

-0.012
(-1.226)

0.003
(0.761)

-0.011
(-0.312)

0.022
(2.012)*

0.015
(0.303)

-0 .116
(-1.290)

G

0.002
(0.587)

0.002
(0.152)

0.021
(2.715)**

0.004
(0.633)

-0.010
(-0.449)

-0.006
(-0.295)

-0.006
(-0.744)

0.005
(0.157)

0.265
(4 .292)**

Adj. RL
F-stat.
Sampk size

0.55
83.87**
70

0.41
57.76**
70

0.34
40.34**
70

0.47
22.34**
70

0.44
17.69**
70

0.42
15.20**
70

0.49
20.14**
70

0.45
15.73**
70

0.49
17.743**
70

00

°'

ROE

First Sub-period (1985-1989)

The financing behavior whole sample regression results in Table 7 indicate that
only the growth and size variables appear with their expected positive signs. This result
suggests that size is an important determinant of the financing decision. It also supports
previous empirical evidence that shows the larger the size of the firm, the easier it is to
get access to the capital market. However, while the size coefficient is significant
throughout the whole sample period and the two sub-periods for the two financing
measure regressions, the growth coefficient is only significant for the second financing
measure regression in the whole period and first sub-period, and for the first financing
measure regression in the second sub-period. Since the second financing measure also
represents the interest-bearing portion of liabilities, it lends support to the pecking order
theory that rapid growth implies higher debt capacity and an ability to pay interest. The
growth measure is only positive and significant for the first financing regression model in
second sub-period. Ironically, this result is not consistent with Table 4 for which a
separate regression analysis was conducted for each group in the sample. None of the
groups exhibits a similar behavior for the growth measure (i.e., positive and significant)
under the second financing decision measure.
The coefficient for the risk variable is negative and significant (except for the first
sub-period) throughout the whole sample period and the two sub-periods. Thus the high
sales volatility may imply a higher probability of financial distress occurring. This result is
consistent with Bradley, Jarrell and Kim (1984) and Jensen, Solberg and Zorn (1992)
who found a negative relation between risk and leverage. However, the liquidity variable
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coefficient appears positive and significant throughout the entire sample periods,
inconsistent with the pecking order theory.
Regression results for the industry dummy group 3 indicate that firms in the
plantation and mining industries consistently prefer to use less interest-bearing loans than
firms in other industries. Due to the nature of these industries, (i.e., long-term
investments in plantation and mining) it is perhaps more likely that firms in these
industries prefer to issue long-term debt rather than relying on a more expensive
financing method.
Results for the group dummy variable under the financing behavior models
provide a more interesting interpretation. The coefficient for the dummy variable G is
positive and significant for the first financing measure, i.e., FINI, for the entire sample
periods. The first financing measure represents the percentage of long-term liabilities to
the total oflong-term liabilities plus market value of equity. This indicates that after
controlling for the explanatory variables, the politically-affiliated group has a significantly
higher FINI measure (about 1 percent higher for the whole sample period) than the
independent groups49 . In contrast, when the second financing measure is used, the
coefficient becomes negative and significant throughout the entire sample periods. The
second financing measure represents the percentage of interest-bearing loans to the total
of interest-bearing loans plus the market value of equity. This result thus suggests that
the independent group prefers to use more interest bearing loans than politically-affiliated
group.

49

This result is consistent with Kester ( 1986). Based on a previous finding by Myer and Majluf ( 1984 ).
he suggested that infonnation effects favor relatively higher financing for the group-affiliated finns in
Japan.
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Nevertheless, the analysis once again does not provide any empirical support to
Yoshihara' s ( 1988) claim that the politically-affiliated group gets easy access to "softloans" provide by government-owned banks and commercial banks. What is evident from
the analysis is, firms in the politically-affiliated group prefer to use more long-term
liabilities than firms in the independent groups. The inference is that the politicallyaffiliated group is involved in long-term government projects, thus it is only appropriate
that long-term projects be financed with long-term liabilities.
To summarize the financing results, the results for the first financing measure
model support the hypothesis that the politically-affiliated group has higher financing
levels than independent group, while the second financing measure model does not
provide support to this hypothesis. It may be true that the politically-affiliated group has
higher financing level, but the higher financing level employed by the group is not due to
its easy access to loans, as claimed by Yoshihara (1988), but rather because of its
involvement in government projects, which generates the need for higher long-term
financing.
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Table 7
Financing Behavior Whole Sample Regression Results
This table presents cross-sectional regression results for financing behavior measure for the whole sample for the whole sample period, 1985-1994, the first
sub-period, 1985-1989, and the second sub-period, 1990-1994, based on average values of FINI and FIN2. The regression model is defined by the two
financing measures used. Risk is defined by the coefficient of variation of annual changes in net sales. GRW is defined by annual compound growth rate in
total assets. Adjustments are made to correct for heteroskedasticity following White (1980). Absolute values of t-statistics are in parentheses. Statistical
significance at the 1 and 5 percent levels are denoted by ** and * respectively.
Ind. Var

Whole Period (1985-1994)
FINI

'°

First Sub-period (1985-1989)

FIN2

FINI

FIN2

Second Sub-period (I990-I994)
FINI

FIN2

Intercept

-0.062 (-2. 721 )**

-0.003 (-0.027)

-0.043 (-0. 941)

-0.441 (-2.126)*

-0.038 (-1 .253)

-0.345 (-1.960)*

GRW

0.019 ( 1.278)

0.202 (3.909)**

0.027 ( 1.671)

0.151 (2.484 )*

0.032 (2.438)*

0.040 (0.815)

SIZE

0.747 (5.892)**

0.431 (7.264)**

0.802 (3.089)**

0.064 (2.140)*

0.811 (4.791)**

0.055 (2.716)**

RlSK

-0.013 (-2.880)**

-0.053 (-3.682)**

-0.027 (-0.227)

-0.199 (-4.570)**

-0.022 (-3.257)**

-0.069 (-2. 776 )**

LIQ

0.015 (5.8 18)**

0.081(5.833)*

O.Ql5 (2.936)* *

0.171 (5.383)**

0.008 (2.224)*

0.031 ( 1.698)

DI

-0.006 (-1.194)

0.055 (3.285)**

-0.031 (-2.993)**

-0.017 (-0.481)

0.004 (0.518)

0.036 (1.369)

D2

0.034 (4 .884)**

-0.152 (-6.708)**

0.003 (0 .206)

-0.240 (-5.102)**

0.039 (4.237)**

-0. 152 (-4 .284)**

G

0.014 (3.006)**

-0.048 (-3 .221)*

0.019 (3 .201)**

-0.098 (-3.126)**

0.122 (3.221)**

-0.085 (-3 .323)**

Adj. R'

0.86
454.61 ••
70

0.63
111.86**
70

0.87
184.86**
70

0.59
35.03**
70

0.90
321.61 **
70

0.56
40.11 **
70

0

F-stat.
Sample size

Table 8 provides the results of the investment behavior whole sample regression
for the whole period and two sub-periods. The negative and significant coefficient of the
growth measure the first investment model is consistent with the results in Table 5,
where growth is consistently negative for each of the groups in the sample. This also
indicates that the hypothesis of positive relation between growth and investment cannot
be supported. On the contrary, the second investment model supports the positive
relationship in previous finding, where growth is positive and significant throughout the
entire sample periods.
The liquidity variable coefficient is negative and significant for the first
investment model, but positive and significant for the second investment model
throughout the entire sample (except in the second sub-period for the first investment
model). The second investment model which represents the stock measure of investment
is not only consistent with Table 5, but it provides further support to Meyer and Kuh' s
(1957) finding that liquidity is a powerful determinant of investment. Nevertheless, the
negative relationship between liquidity and the first investment measure indicates that the
higher the liquidity, the lower the flow measure of investment.
However, the risk variable coefficient is negative and significant for both
investment models throughout the entire sample periods. The reason could be that banks
may be reluctant to finance investments of firms with higher risk. This is consistent with
the result in Table 6. Table 6 shows that the risk variable coefficient has a negative and
significant sign for both financing models for the entire sample periods, which indicates
that financing is lower when risk is high.
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Results for the dummy variable G demonstrate that politically-affiliated group has
a significantly higher flow measure of investment during the two sub-periods than does
the independent group, but a significantly lower stock measure of investments than
independent group throughout the entire sample periods. The investment results partly
support the hypothesis that the politically-affiliated group has a higher investment level
than the independent group.
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Table 8
Investment Behavior Whole Sample Regression Results
This table presents cross-sectional regression results for investment behavior for the whole sample for the whole sample period, 1985-1994, the first sub-period,
1985-1989. and the second sub-period, 1990-1994, based on average values ofINVl , INV2. The regression model is defined by the two investment measures
used. Risk is defined by the coefficient of variation of annual changes in net operating income. GR W is defined by annual compound growth rate in total assets.
Adjustments are made to correct for heteroskedasticity following White (1980). Absolute values oft-statistics are in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1
and 5 percent levels are denoted by** and* respectively.
Ind.
Var

Whole Period (1985-1994)
INVl

,_,
'°

INV2

First Sub-period (1985-1989)
INVl

INV2

Second Sub-period (1990-1994)
INV!

INV2

intercept

0.071 (l.407)

-0.337 (-5.40 1)**

0.928 (3.815)**

0.109 (0.874)

0.431 (3 .226)**

-0.124 (-1.324)

GRW

-0. 187 (-4.979)**

0.444 (9.058)**

-0.159 (-1.026)

0.034 (0.709)

-0.526 (-8.609 )**

0.205 (4.803)**

LIQ

-0.248 (3.451)**

0.1 09 (13 .25)**

-0.124 (-4.492)**

0.053 (3.738)**

-0.469 (-0.298)

0.086 (7.872)**

RISK

-0.414 (-3 .03)**

-0.059 (-3 .348)**

-0.154 (-4.409)**

-0.089 (-2.681)**

-0.126 (-3.486)**

-0.126 (-5 .03 l)**

DJ

0.266 (2.094)*

0.038 (2.279)*

0.122(2.021)*

0.074 (2.384)*

0.659 (1.874)

0.00 1 (0.004)

02

-0.122 (-0.746)

0. 157 (7.350)**

-0.105 (-1.378)

0.155 (3.977)**

-0.682 (-2.338)*

0.12 1(3 .751)**

G

0.181 (l.829)

-0.102 (-7.887)**

0.161 (3.445)**

-0.041 (-2.695)**

0.116 (3. 377)**

-0.166 (-8.350)**

0.37
27.28**
70

0.42
45.54**
70

0.36
38.73**
70

0.38
42.72**
70

0.48
39.39**
70

0.36
25.45**
70

Adj. R

2

F-Stat.
Sample size

All Samples Pooled Cross-S ectional Regression Analysis
Tables 9, 10 and 11 present the pooled cross-sectional regression analysis results
for the whole samples. Ironically, unlike earlier findings, results for profitability
performance measures in Table 9 show that all the coefficients for the variables appear
with the expected signs though few are significant. The coefficient for group dummy
variable is positive and significant for all the profitability measures. Thus, it confirms
earlier findings that politically-affilated group achieved higher performance compared to
independent group. The financing behavior measure pooled regression results are
consistent with Table 8. The coefficients for the variables of both financing measures
appear with the expected signs but only size coefficient is not significant. The group
dummy variable is consistent with results in Table 7, since it is positive for first financing
measure and negative for second financing measure. Results for the investment measures
provides support to the hypothesis of positive relation between growth and investment,
even though previous analysis in the study consistently found a negative relation between
the two measures. The coefficient for liquidity measure is consistent with the results in
Table 7. The coefficient is negative and significant for the first investment model but
positive and significant for the second investment model. Similarly, the coefficient of risk
is positive for the first measure but negative for the second measure, even though
previous results in the study found risk to be consistently negative for both investment
measures. The group dummy variable is also consistent with Table 8, where the
coefficient is positive for the first investment measure and negative for the second
investment measure.

94

TABLE 9
Profitability Performance Pooled Regression Results
This table presents cross-sectional pooled regression results for profitability performance measures for
the whole sample based on two sub-period averages of ROA, ROE and R* (i.e., 1984-1989 and 19901994). The regression model is defined by the three performance measures used. Risk is defined by the
coefficient of variation of annual changes in net sales. Adjustments are made to correct for
heteroskedasticity following White (1980). Absolute values oft-statistics are in parentheses. Statistical
significance at the l and 5 percent levels are denoted by ** and * respectively.

Ind. Var

ROA

ROE

R*

Intercept

-0. 175 (-2 .145)**

-0.311 (-2 .608)*

0.503 (2.661)**

SIZE

-0.037 (-2.469)**

-0.001 (-0.513)

-0.091 (-3 .761)**

RISK

0.01 l (10.875)**

0.415 (0.621)

0.165 (7.058)**

LIQ

0.002 (5.705)**

0.225 (0.324)

0.065 (2.921)**

Dl

-0.026 (-5.414)**

0.005 (0.108)

-0.014 (-0.108)

D2

-0.0178 (-2.726)**

0.145 (1.279)

-0.108 (-0.052)

G

0.025 (5 .587)**

0.002 (3 .152)**

0.024 (2.571)**

Adj. R2

0.78

0.70

0.64

F-stat.

68.34 **

62. 19**

54.63**

Sample size

140

140

140
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TABLE IO
Financing Behavior Pooled Regression Results
This table presents cross-sectional pooled regression results for financing behavior measures for the
whole sample based on two sub-period averages ofFINland FIN2 (i.e., 1984-1989 and 1990-1994). The
regression model is defined by the two financing measures used. Risk is defined by the coefficient of
variation of annual changes in net sales. GRW is defined by by annual compound growth rate in total
assets. Adjustments are made to correct for heteroskedasticity following White (1980). Absolute values
oft-statistics are in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1 and 5 percent levels are denoted by **
and* respectively.

Ind. Var

FIN2

FINI

Intercept

0.126 (l.483)

-0.224 (-0.647)

GRW

0.877 (18.37)**

0.228 (5. 108)**

SIZE

0.042 (1.030)

0.098 (2.881)**

RISK

-0.056 (-3 .121)**

-0.098 (-2.868)**

LIQ

0.026 (4.525)**

0.260 (12.540)**

DI

0.036 (-3 .655)**

-0.034 (-2.641)**

D2

0.007 (0.667)

-0.123 (-3 .663)**

G

0.012 (2.644)**

-0.048 (3 .206)**

Adj. R2

0.97

0.95

F-stat.

423 .15**

334 .52**

Sample size

140

140

9G

TABLE 11
Investment Behavior Pooled Regression Results
This table presents cross-sectional pooled regression results for investment behavior measures for the
whole sample based on two sub-period averages of INVland INV2 (i.e., 1984-1989 and 1990-1994).
The regression model is defined by the two investment measures used. Risk is defined by the coefficient
of variation of annual changes in net operating income. GR W is defined by annual compound growth
rate in total assets. Risk is defined by the coefficient of variation of annual changes in net sales. GRW is
defined by by annual compound growth rate in total assets. Adjustments are made to correct for
heteroskedasticity following White (1980). Absolute values oft-statistics are in parentheses. Statistical
significance at the l and 5 percent levels are denoted by •• and * respectively.

Ind. Var

INV!

INV2

Intercept

3.229 (2.478)**

0.199 (1.465)

GRW

0.430 (2.150)**

0.362(-3 .233)**

RISK

1.833 (4.236)**

-0. 174 (-2.754)**

LIQ

-0.821 (-3 .218)**

0.034(2.903)**

Dl

-0.097 (-0.307)

0.035 (2 .971)**

02

-0.921 (-0.611)

0.019 (1.147)

G

0.182 (1.049)

-0.102 (-3 .778)**

0.57

0.52

F-stat.

72.85**

65.54**

Sample size

140

140

Adj . R

2
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Summary
The summary statistics show that there are some significant differences in the
coefficients of the dependent and independent variables between the politically-affiliated
business group and the independent group. The regression analysis results for the
profitability performance and investment measures do not support the hypothesis of
different profitability performance and investment behavior between the politicallyaffiliated group and the independent group. The regression results for the marketadjusted return model appear to be similar for both the politically-affiliated group and the
fully independent group, while the regression results for both the investment measures
also appear similar for the politically-affiliated group and the independent group.
The all-samples regression results provide interesting evidence. First, the first
hypothesis, that of superior profitability performance for the politically-affiliated group,
is only supported under the market-adjusted return model and not under the ROA or
ROE model. ROA and ROE are not significantly different between the politicallyaffiliated group and the independent group. Second, results from the first financing
measure model support the hypothesis that the politically-affiliated group has higher
financing level than does the independent group, but the second financing measure does
not provide support to this hypothesis. Third, the investment model results partly
support the hypothesis that the politically-affiliated group has higher investment measure
level than the independent group .
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION AND LIMITATIONS

Conclusions
This dissertation has examined and compared the profitability performance,
investment and financing decisions of the politically-affiliated business group of Malaysia
to the independent business groups of Malaysia.
Chapter 2 described the development of the New Economic Policy and the
political involvement in business in Malaysia. Attempts have also been made to compare
the political-affiliated group to the keiretsu of Japan. This study has identified several
characteristics possessed by the Japanese keiretsu and the Malaysian politically-affiliated
group, and has also identified some characteristics which differentiate the two groups.
Chapter 3 developed the hypotheses of the preferential treatment hypothesis.
Additionally, it reviewed previous literature and findings for each of the variables used in
the study. Chapter 4 described the selection of the politically-affiliated group, the two
independent groups, the period of the study, and the variable measures. Chapter 5
presented the summary statistics, and analyzed the results of the ordinary least squares
regression models of the study.
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The sub-period analysis in chapter 5 largely supports the hypothesis of superior
profitability performance of the politically-affiliated group . However, while the results of
ordinary least squares financing decisions model supported the third hypothesis of
different financing behavior between the politically-affiliated group and independent
group in Malaysia, the regression results of the investment decisions model did not
support the second hypothesis of different investment behavior.
The following major findings of this dissertation deserve emphasis:
•

Based on ROE and R * as profitability performance measures, the performance of
politically-affiliated business group is lower compared to independent group during
the first sub-period. This result is consistent with Nak:atani (1984) and Weinstein and
Yafeh (1995) which found group affiliated firms in Japan obtained lower profitability
than independent firms. This result also indicates that the preferential treatment
enforced during the NEP era did not produce quality Bumiputera entrepreneur
group.

•

The second sub-period of the profitability performance50 analysis provides a different
scenario altogether. The politically-affiliated group made a remarkable recovery from
the first sub-period and achieved a significantly superior profitability performance
compared to the independent groups. The conjecture is that government privatization
plans during the second sub-period had a positive impact on the group profitability

so The profitability performance measure mentioned here is the market-adjusted return, R* . When return
on asset, ROA, and return on equity, ROE, are used as the profitability perforn1ance, the results turned
out to be not significantly differently. Thus the inference is tl1at, the economic definition of profit
provides a more powerful evidence for the study compared to the accounting definition of profit.
Apparently, the investors ' expectation of economic perforn1ance of the politically-affiliated business is
higher than their expectation of independent group.
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performance. The preferential treatment hypothesis during the second sub-period can
be supported.
•

Politically-affiliated group favors higher financing compared to independent group.
This result is consistent with Kester ( 1986) who found that because of information
effect, group affiliated firms in Japan favors higher financing than independent firms.

•

Even though the hypothesis that the politically-affiliated business group has higher
financing level than independent group is supported empirically, the inference is that
the higher financing level is not due to easy access to loans, (since the second
financing measure failed to provide any evidence), but rather due to the length of
time of the long-term government projects in which the politically-affiliated business
group is involved in being the reason for the higher level of long-term financing.

•

Contrary to previous assertion by Yoshihara (1988), politically-affiliated business
group does not favor interest-bearing loans (short term loans included) any more
than the independent group. The summary statistics also indicate that the politicallyaffiliated group does not enjoy higher liquidity than independent group . This finding
is not consistent with Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1990) who found that groupaffiliated firms in Japan are less liquidity constrained than independent firms.

•

This study provides empirical support to the conjecture that firms in the politicallyaffiliated group help out one another in times of financial distress. In the financing
decision measure model, the relationship between risk and leverage is positive and
significant for the politically-affiliated group, but the reverse is true for the
independent groups. Thus, banks may be reluctant to extend loans to independent
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firms with high operating risk, but this is not so for the politically-affiliated group.
Alternatively, it could mean that when firms in the politically-affiliated group are
experiencing financial distress, commercial banks are under strong political pressure
to offer financial assistance.
•

Generally, the main thrust of the study is that it supports the preferential treatment
hypothesis of superior profitability performance for the politically-affiliated group
only in the second sub-period. Since the second sub-period marks the end of the New
Economic Policy, the inference is that the benefit of the Policy is fully exploited after
after the policy ends.

Limitations
A generalization of the results may be limited due to the nature of the politicallyaffiliated group sample, which consists of only 35 firms. Some listed companies which
are closely affiliated to the ruling party and owned by nominee companies are excluded
from the samples to avoid further complications. The size of the samples could have been
larger if more information was available on the identities of beneficiaries for the nominee
companies. Moreover, since this study requires complete financial data for a full ten-year
period, due to a lack of data, the sample size was further reduced.
The existing models are constructed based on the principle of parsimony subject
to the financial and data constraints. Possibly, some important variables may have been
2

omitted which could provide some explanation of the small adjusted R throughout the
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results. Perhaps a stronger test than White (1980) to adjust for heteroskedasticity may
produce more significant results throughout.
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APPENDIX I
Definition of Variables

Profitability Performance
1. ROA

Return on asset

2. ROE

Return on equity

3. R*

Market adjusted rate of return = (Average annual stock
return - average annual market return)

Investment Measures
1. INVI

changes in net fixed investments I total fixed investments

2. INV2 ·

net fixed asset/ book value of total assets

Financing Measures
1. FINI

(total liabilities - current liabilities)/ (total liabilities current liabilities+ book value of equity)

2. FIN2

(interest-bearing loans)/ (interest-bearing loans +market
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APPENDIX I (continue)

Growth
1. GRW

annualized compound growth rate in total assets

2. Q

(total liabilities + market value of equity)/(total liabilities
+book value of equity)

Size

log (market equity)

Risk
1. CVl

The coefficient of variation of annual changes m net
operating income

2. CV2

The coefficient of variation of annual changes m net
sales

3. Beta
Liquidity (LIQ)

beta coefficient
income after tax + accounting depreciation - dividend
payments

Industry Classification
1. Dl

D 1 = 1 if industry grouping is 1 and zero otherwise

2. D2

D2 = 1 if industry grouping is 3 and zero otherwise

Grou Classification G
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APPENDIX II
SAMPLE OF PRIVATIZATION PROJECTS BETWEEN 1983 THROUGH 1991

1'

0
-..J

I

· l'nvatize:!l"K·tOJects ~; .·

ir~ N ~X.~@:!IU!!lllll~J}~tiW.'fi¥Y:atoottfo~~

Sistem Television (M)

1983

Build Operate

Fleet Group

Sports Toto

1985

Sale of Equity

Berjaya Group

Malaysian International Shipping Corp.

1986

Sale of Equity

Trust Agencies

N-S Highway

1988

Build-Operate-Transfer

UEM

Edaran Otomobil

1990

Sale of Equity

HI COM

CIMA

1990

Sale of Equity

UEM

Perusahaan Otomobil Nasional

1991

Sale of Equity

HI COM

APPENDIX ill
List of Politically-affiliated Firms

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13 .
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23 .
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33 .
34.
35 .

Faber Group Berhad
Berjaya Sports Toto
Granite Industries Berhad
Malaysian Resources Corporation Berhad
Renong Berhad
Benta Plantation
Ayer Hitam Tin Dredging
Kampung Lanjut Tin Berhad
Kramat Tin Berhad
Malaysian Mining Corporation
Petaling Tin Berhad
Tronoh Tin Mines
Malakoff Berhad
RJReynolds
Uniphoenix Corporation
Aokam Perdana
Berjaya Industrial
Cement Industries Malaysia Berhad
Cold Storage (M) Berhad
Cycle and Carriage (M) Berhad
Land and General
Hume Industries
Berjaya Group
Kentucky Fried Chicken Holdings
Kinta Kellas Public Limited Companies
New Straits Times Press (M) Berhad
OYL Industries
Technological Resources Industries
Berjaya Leisure
Setron (M) Berhad
Berjaya Textiles
Time Engineering Berhad
Sistem Televisyen Malaysia Berhad
United Engineers Malaysia
Uniphone Telecommunication Berhad
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APPENDIX IV
List of Matching Independent Firms

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11 .
12.
13 .
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21 .
22.
23 .
24.
25 .
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
3 1.
32.
33 .
34.
35 .

Bolton Properties
IGB Corporation
Landmarks Berhad
Asia Pacific Berhad
Pelangi Berhad
Kemayan Oil Palm
Lingui Development
Berjuntai Tin Holdings Berhad
Kuchai Development Berhad
Rahman Hydraulic
Timah Langat
Asiatic Development
Ajinomoto (M) Berhad
Amalgamated Steel Mills (M) Berhad
Carlsberg Brewery (M) Berhad
Chemical Company ofMalaysia
Chocolate Products (M) Berhad
DNP Holdings Berhad
Olympic Industries Berhad
East Asiatic Companies
Federal Flour Mills (M) Berhad
George Kent (M) Berhad
Grand United Holdings
Johan Holdings Berhad
Lien Hoe Group Berhad
Malaya Glass Berhad
Matsushita Electric Company (M) Berhad
Malaysian Mosaic Berhad
Mycom Berhad
Oriental Holdings
Pan Malaysian Cement Works
Shell Refining Company (M) Berhad
Tan Chong Motor Holdings
Leader Universal Holdings
Worldwide Holdings Berhad
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APPENDIX V
List of Fully Independent Firms

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11 .
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21 .
22.
23.
24.
25 .
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31 .
32.
33.
34.
35 .

Bandaraya Development Berhad
Bolton Properties Berhad
Metroplex Berhad
Paramount Corporation Berhad
Petaling Garden Berhad
Selangor Properties Berhd
Kulirn (M) Berhad
Selangor Coconuts Berhad
TDM Berhad
Anson Perdana Berhad
Jeram Kuantan (M) Berhad
Kuala Sidim Rubber Co. Limited
Riverview Rubber Estates Berhad
Sungei Bagan Rubber Co. (M) Berhad
Chocolate Products (M) Berhad
General Corporation Berhad
Hexza Corporation Berhad
IJM Corporation Berhad
Innovest Berhad
Jack Chia Enterprises (M) Berhad
Johan Holdings Berhad
Khong Guan Holdings (M) Berhad
Kumpulan Emas Berhad
Larut Consolidated Berhad
Lien Hoe Corporation Berhad
Malaysian Mosaics Berhad
MWE Holdings Berhad
Oriental Holdings Berhad
Pegi (M) Berhad
Sanyo Industries (M) Berhad
Sitt Tatt Berhad
South Malaysia Industries Berhad
Inchcape Timuran Berhad
VACBerhad
United Malayan Flour Mills Berhad.
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